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THE PATHOLOGIES OF BANKING BUSINESS AS 
USUAL 
Hilary J. Allen* 
The Wolf of Wall Street’s Jordan Belfort is the latest popular culture 
depiction of the “banker behaving badly” we love to hate.  However, the 
Jordan Belforts of the world do not cause financial crises—the reality is far 
less sexy.  This Article argues that financial crises are caused by ordinary 
financial industry personnel engaging in everyday behavior that is not 
fraudulent, but nonetheless has the potential to generate huge social 
problems in the quest for short-term profits.  In particular, this Article 
focuses on the destabilizing potential of complex innovation and 
leverage—two pathologies of banking business as usual.  This Article 
argues that criminal law, private litigation and command-and-control 
regulation are all limited in their ability to restrain these non-fraudulent but 
destabilizing behaviors, and so we must also address the prevailing “Wall 
Street” culture that promotes these behaviors with little regard for their 
social costs. 
Many proponents of financial regulatory reform have ignored the issue 
of industry culture—perhaps because the problem often seems intractable.  
Instead, most reform efforts have tinkered around the edges of destabilizing 
behaviors, with the tacit understanding that the industry will constantly 
arbitrage regulations in an endless cat-and-mouse game.  However, we 
need not be entirely fatalistic about financial industry culture: there is a 
large empirical literature that demonstrates that people often do make 
sacrifices for the public good, and this Article is the first to use this “pro-
social” literature to inform proposals for financial industry reform. 
It would be pretty shallow to attribute the cultural pathologies of Wall 
Street at their roots to bad people working there. The trouble, instead, is 
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that the structural conditions of the financial industry have fostered certain 
cultural norms. If you are designing policies to fix Wall Street, you need to 
take into account how they will shape that culture.1 
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INTRODUCTION 
Our popular culture is replete with real and fictional examples of 
bankers behaving badly.  From Wall Street’s Gordon Gekko to The Wolf of 
Wall Street’s Jordan Belfort, from Milken to Madoff, our society loves to 
hate flamboyant financiers who lie, cheat and steal their way to success—
and then get their comeuppance in the form of a criminal conviction.  It is 
not surprising, then, that the American public is angry that none of the 
bankers who caused the financial crisis of 2007–2008 (the “Financial 
Crisis”) were sent to jail.2  After all, because the financial system is the 
 
       1.   Jonathan Chait, Barack Obama, Ta-Nehisi Coates, Poverty and Culture, N.Y. 
MAGAZINE, Mar. 19, 2014, http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2014/03/obama-ta-nehisi-
coates-poverty-and-culture.html. 
 2.  See, e.g., Matt Taibbi, Why Isn’t Wall Street in Jail?, ROLLING STONE, Mar. 3, 
2011, at 44, which pithily sums up the situation as “[e]verything’s [expletive], and nobody 
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primary provider of credit to the broader economy,3 the failure of financial 
institutions and markets during the Financial Crisis generated broader 
economic recessions,4 increased unemployment, eviscerated pensions, 
increased the rate of household bankruptcies, and even damaged personal 
health.5  However, as this Article will explore, financial crises are caused 
by behavior that is much more mundane and widespread than the flashy 
frauds we see in the movies. 
This is in many ways an inconvenient conclusion.  It would be easier 
if we could classify the individual sources of financial instability as 
dishonest or untrustworthy villains—“bad apples” are relatively few and far 
between, and their bad behavior is relatively easy to identify and punish.  In 
reality, however, financial crises result from everyday activities performed 
by large swathes of the financial industry in an attempt to maximize short-
term profits.  In particular, reliance on large amounts of leverage, as well as 
financial innovation that exacerbates complexity—two pathologies of 
banking business as usual—are rarely dishonest or sensational, but evince a 
lack of concern for how society will suffer when the financial system is 
destabilized.  However, neither criminal law nor private litigation is 
particularly adept at addressing these pathologies, and traditional financial 
 
goes to jail” (quoting a former Senate investigator). 
 3.  “This strong connection between financial markets and real economic activity, 
particularly when financial markets cease to function, is what has made so many of the 
crises . . . such spectacular historic events.”  CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, 
THIS TIME IS DIFFERENCE: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY xliv (2009).  Banks are the 
“backup source of liquidity to all other institutions, financial and nonfinancial.”  E. Gerald 
Corrigan, Summary of Are Banks Special?, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS (Jan 
1, 1983), available at https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/annual-reports/are-
banks-special.  “Banks enable people to borrow money, and, today, by operating electronic-
transfer systems, they allow commerce to take place without notes and coins changing 
hands. They also play a critical role in channeling savings into productive investments. . . . 
[M]any businesses rely on the banks to fund their day-to-day operations.”  John Cassidy, 
What Good is Wall Street?, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 29, 2010, at 49-50.  
 4.  The Financial Crisis spurred what has been called the “Great Recession” which 
started in December 2007, and officially ended in June 2009.  Even after the Great 
Recession officially ended, the United States economy remained sluggish.  Catherine 
Rampell, The Recession Has (Officially) Ended, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (Sept. 30, 2010, 1:50 
p.m.), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/20/the-recession-has-officially-
ended/?_r=0. 
 5.  See, e.g.,Mona Fiuzat et al., United States Stock Market Performance and Acute 
Myocardial Infarction Rates in 2008–2009 (from the Duke Databank for Cardiovascular 
Disease), 106 AM. J. CARDIOLOGY, 1545, 1545-49 (2010) (showing a correlation between 
the stock market performance in 2008-2009 and heart health); Aaron Reeves et. al., Increase 
in State Suicide Rates in the USA During Economic Recession, 380 THE LANCET 1813, 
1813-14 (2012), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140673612 
619102 (shedding light on America’s mental health problems as a consequence of the 
recession). 
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regulation also has its limits—if the law can’t make financial industry 
personnel eschew destabilizing behaviors, then they will only do so if they 
view themselves as stewards of financial stability who are willing to make 
some sacrifices for the greater good.  Unfortunately, while it is not 
unreasonable to expect more than a purely self-interested mentality from 
the financial industry—it is, after all, “a heavily subsidized industry that 
carries out major quasi-governmental functions and is fully dependent on 
government business and support for its current scale of operations”6— 
regrettably, financial industry culture does not currently reflect the 
privileged and quasi-public role that financial institutions play in society.  
(This Article shall use the short-hand “failure of indirect other-regarding 
behavior” to describe situations where the financial industry demonstrates a 
failure of empathy by not considering the negative externalities that harm 
people with whom they have no direct connection).7 
This Article therefore asserts that we must also explore proposals to 
reform financial industry culture.  While financial industry personnel are 
often considerate of others in their non-work life, more self-interested, 
short-termist norms have displaced norms of indirect other-regarding 
behavior in many of their workplaces.8  Part of this Article’s purpose, then, 
is to explore policies that would allow the other-regarding norms that drive 
individuals outside of the workplace to fulfill their promise as potential 
modifiers of destabilizing behavior within the workplace.  The intention is 
to use a number of strategies to create a social context wherein the 
prevailing norm is for financial institution personnel to give some 
consideration to the negative externalities of their actions, with the 
consequence that deviating from that norm for the purpose of making short-
term gains will expose the deviator to censure and opprobrium from their 
peers within the firm and industry, and damage their own self-concept as 
stewards for the financial system. 
Of course, a more other-regarding industry culture is not a panacea for 
financial stability.  Individual judgments by industry personnel about what 
behaviors best balance self-interest and other-regarding norms will often 
differ, and given the complexity and uncertainty inherent in the financial 
system, even well-intended actions will sometimes fail to create the most 
 
 6.  Lawrence G. Baxter, Capture Nuances in Financial Regulation, 47 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 537, 563 (2012); see also Mehrsa Baradaran, Banking and the Social Contract, 89 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1283, 1339 (2013). 
 7.  For a discussion of systemic risk and instability as negative externalities, see 
Howell E. Jackson, Centralization, Competition, and Privatization in Financial Regulation, 
2 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 649, 671 (2001).   
 8.  See infra text accompanying notes 35-37 (suggesting that Wall-Street culture 
favors short-term profitability above all else). 
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optimal conditions for financial stability.9  Despite this potential for 
inconsistency and mistakes, however, there is inherent value in 
“engender[ing] a culture in which firms continually question[] the impact 
of their activities on others.”10  Even in the presence of cognitive errors, 
destabilizing behavior is less likely when financial industry participants are 
willing to consider the externalities of their actions, rather than focusing 
myopically on self-interest. 
As a first step towards reforming financial industry culture, this 
Article explores a series of complementary reforms directed at business 
schools and financial institution corporate governance (focusing 
particularly on boards of directors and compliance and risk-management 
functions).  It also explores how financial industry self-regulation might be 
harnessed to create a prevailing industry culture which values avoiding 
social harm.  To be clear, this Article is not arguing for complete 
abnegation of self-interest by the financial industry, nor is it arguing for the 
elimination of risk-taking: either outcome would be undesirable, as well as 
a fool’s errand.  Instead, this Article advocates for a change in culture such 
that financial industry participants “behave as if [society’s] comfort and 
welfare were, if not necessarily at the top of their ‘to-do’ list, still worth 
consideration.”11 The proposed reforms are designed to stress the 
magnitude of the benefits of financial stability for the broader public (so 
that the financial industry feels that sacrifices made are worthwhile), and 
increase contacts between the financial industry and the broader public (to 
help erode the existing in-group versus out-group orientation that makes 
the financial industry less likely to value the well-being of the broader 
public).12 Some of the proposals are designed to instill a better 
understanding of financial instability as a phenomenon that is at least 
partially caused by the financial industry’s activities, rather than an 
automatic and inevitable part of the business cycle for which the financial 
industry bears no responsibility. 
All of these proposals will require the buy-in of authority figures 
(business school professors, financial institution board members or senior 
management, as the case may be) to succeed.  They are also predicated on 
 
 9.  See infra text accompanying notes 155-163 (discussing the complexity of the 
financial system). 
 10.  Dan Awrey, William Blair & David Kershaw, Between Law and Markets: Is There 
a Role for Culture and Ethics in Financial Regulation, (London Sch. Of Econ., Legal 
Studies Working Paper No. 14/2012, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2157588. 
 11.  LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: HOW GOOD LAWS MAKE GOOD PEOPLE 7 
(2010). 
 12.  Onnig H. Dombalagian, The Expressive Synergies of the Volcker Rule, 54 B.C. L. 
REV. 469, 498 (2013); Cristie L. Ford, Toward a New Model for Securities Law 
Enforcement, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 757, 763 (2005). 
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the understanding that it is both possible and appropriate for the actions of 
financial sector personnel to be informed by more than just self-interest.  
As such, accepting the value of this Article’s proposals entails at least a 
partial rejection of the “self-interest” part of the neoclassical economic 
assumption that all persons act only to maximize rational self-interest.  To 
this end, this Article relies on the wealth of empirical research that supports 
the existence of a universal norm of indirect other-regarding behavior that 
directs us to consider the effects of our actions on others beyond our 
immediate counterparties.13  In cultures as varied as “Orma cattle herders in 
Kenya” and “Lamalara whale-hunters in Indonesia”, researchers have 
found that people will sometimes make sacrifices for the greater good,14 
and the expectation that people will empathize with the plight of others, 
and refrain from harming others, is even stronger than the expectation that 
people will actively assist others.15  That is not to say that self-interest is 
irrelevant to people’s motivations—only that people are often willing to 
make small sacrifices for the greater good.  If the sacrifice demanded is too 
large, however, self-interest is likely to carry the day.16  As such, while the 
reforms proposed in this Article are conceptually separate from proposals 
that have been made to align the incentives of financial institution 
personnel with the interests of the public in long-term stability (these 
incentive-based proposals appeal entirely to the actor’s self-interest), the 
two types of proposals are necessarily complementary.  Incentives must be 
structured such that there is not too much personal cost involved in 
avoiding the pathologies of banking business as usual: cultural reform is 
more apt for the fine-tuning of behaviors once there are no longer 
overwhelming incentives to act in a particular poor way. 
The remainder of this Article will proceed as follows.  Section I will 
explore in more detail the pathologies of banking business as usual.  It 
considers two particularly important pathologies in the abstract—namely, 
the use of leverage, and certain types of complexity-inducing financial 
innovation—as well as utilizes more concrete examples from the Financial 
Crisis, and the more recent scandal relating to JPMorgan’s “London 
 
 13.  Coughlin notes that “[t]he socio-economic literature is replete with examples of 
how models that assume the pursuit of narrow self-interest simply do not work as well as 
those that provide a more complete and more realistic portrayal of human motivation.”  
Richard M. Coughlin, Whose Morality?  Which Community?  What Interests?  Socio-
economic and Communitarian Perspectives, 25 J. SOCIO-ECONOMICS 135, 140 (1996).  
Much of this research is summarized in STOUT, supra note 11, at 75-93. 
 14.  The research on other-regarding behavior recognizes that incentives play a role in 
driving behavior, although it contradicts the assumption that we only ever act to maximize 
self-interest.  STOUT, supra note 11 at 82.   
 15.  Zak, infra note 21, at 267; Solomon, infra note 24, at 20. 
 16.  STOUT, supra note 11, at 99. 
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Whale” trading losses, to explain how behavior that is self-interested, but 
stops short of fraud, is the usual culprit in times of financial instability.  
Section II explores a range of business school and institutional governance 
reforms designed to inculcate a more other-regarding culture in the 
financial industry.  Section III emphasizes the need for such cultural reform 
by demonstrating that strategies typically used to combat financial 
misconduct—including criminal prosecution and private litigation—are ill-
suited to addressing non-fraudulent destabilizing behaviors.  Section III 
also explores the limitations of command-and-control regulation 
(particularly its susceptibility to arbitrage), and the difficulties inherent in 
precisely aligning the incentives of the financial industry with society’s 
interests in financial stability.  While rules and incentives remain important 
tools for engendering financial stability, this Article argues that they should 
be complemented by policies that promote cultural reform.   
I. THE PATHOLOGIES OF BANKING BUSINESS AS USUAL 
Broadly speaking, two meta-narratives have emerged as explanations 
for the Financial Crisis.  One narrative sees the Crisis as the confluence of 
appropriately self-interested actions by individuals who were simply 
confounded by complexity and cognitive failures17: buyers and sellers of 
financial products all failed to appreciate the risks that were being taken in 
the lead up to—and eventually precipitated—the Financial Crisis.  This 
first account of the Crisis asserts that destabilizing behaviors were 
problematic, but cannot be addressed by cultural reform (and should not be 
punished) because they resulted from purely cognitive errors with no 
attendant moral culpability.18  Counterpoised against this first narrative is 
the “moral failure” narrative, which asserts that the institutions buying and 
selling financial products did appreciate the risks that were being taken in 
the lead-up to the Crisis, but were happy to maximize their own self-
interest by consciously duping their counterparties.19 
This Article argues for a middle path—neither cognitive nor moral 
failures should be considered in isolation.  While it is true that market 
participants will never have perfect information or be able to make perfect 
decisions about something as complex as the financial system,20 it is also 
 
 17.  Arnold Kling, The Financial Crisis: Moral Failure or Cognitive Failure?, 33 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 507, 507-09 (2010); Donald C. Langevoort, Chasing the Greased 
Pig Down Wall Street: A Gatekeeper’s Guide to the Psychology, Culture, and Ethics of 
Financial Risk Taking, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1209, 1210 (2011). 
 18.  Kling, supra note 17, at 507-09. 
 19.  Langevoort, supra note 17, at 1210-11. 
 20.  Id. at 1210. 
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true that they will rarely be entirely ignorant of what is going on in that 
system.  Instead, market participants will usually be making partially 
informed decisions, and some type of moral judgment will need to 
supplement that decision-making in order to fill the informational and 
cognitive void.21  In particular, moral norms function as a lens through 
which information is viewed and assessed—risks are sometimes 
underappreciated as unimportant, not only because the decision-maker had 
difficulty comprehending those risks, but also because the consequences of 
those risks would be borne largely by other people if they came to 
fruition.22  Moral and cognitive failures are thus intertwined, and must be 
analyzed as such. 
This Article seeks to explain how the moral and cognitive failures of 
the financial industry intertwine to generate financial instability.  In order 
to do so, it must engage with a preliminary under-theorized question: what 
precisely is meant by “moral norms” and “morality” in the financial 
stability context?  There is not just one normative standard that governs the 
behavior of the financial industry: as Jodi Short has identified, “[c]orporate 
financial conduct . . . is subject to multiple and potentially conflicting 
normative systems.”23  This Article therefore takes on the task of unpacking 
some of the moral normative systems that currently apply to Wall Street 
personnel.  While there are centuries of religious and philosophical 
literature that explore the boundaries of morality, this Article will leave 
such religious and philosophical debates to those better qualified to engage 
in them.24  Instead, this Article is informed by ethnographical research on 
 
 21.  “[M]orals are not a creation of reason, but a second tradition independent from the 
tradition of reason, which helps us adapt to problems which exceed by far the limits of our 
capacity of rational perception”.  Paul J. Zak, Values and Value: Moral Economics, in 
MORAL MARKETS: THE CRITICAL ROLE OF VALUES IN THE ECONOMY, 259, 259 (Paul J. Zak 
ed., 2008) (quoting Friedrich von Hayek); see also Susan A. Bandes, Emotions and Risk 
Regulation, in 62 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 219, 220 (Bettina Lange et al. 
eds., 2013).  
 22.  In the behavioral economics literature, this is known as “incentive bias”: “In this 
case, the actor knows or has good reason to know that the facts are a certain way, but 
deliberately ignores the facts, suppresses information, or distorts analysis out of a conscious 
intention to promote the actor’s own interests.”  Geoffrey P. Miller & Gerald Rosenfeld, 
Intellectual Hazard: How Conceptual Biases in Complex Organizations Contributed to the 
Crisis of 2008, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 807, 817 (2010). 
 23.  Jodi L. Short, Competing Normative Frameworks and the Limits of Deterrence 
Theory: Comments on Baker and Griffith’s Ensuring Corporate Misconduct, 38 LAW & 
SOC. INQUIRY 493, 501 (2013). 
 24.  Some scholars have evinced a distaste for confusing the religious aspects of 
morality with law: there is a sense, for some, that “to make a personal statement about the 
immorality of a particular type of securities transaction is to confuse oneself with God.”  
John H. Walsh, A Simple Code of Ethics: A History of the Moral Purpose Inspiring Federal 
Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1015 (2001) (discussing Manne’s 
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the norms that are particular to and prevalent in the financial industry,25 as 
well as a large body of empirical research by ethnographers, 
anthropologists and neuroscientists on moral norms that tend to apply 
universally around the world and across cultures.26  People tend to feel 
ashamed when they violate the moral norms that exist in their culture, and 
as such, these universal moral norms can be powerful regulators of 
behavior, even in the absence of formal enforcement mechanisms.27 
Research on universal moral norms has identified that humans 
generally expect compliance with norms relating to recognition of property 
rights and prohibitions on murder, rape and certain other forms of 
violence.28  There are also certain universal moral norms that are highly 
salient to financial regulation.  One is honesty,29 and a broad literature has 
emerged that explores how honesty is essential to economic interactions 
between people.30  Another universal moral norm that is highly salient to—
but almost entirely unexplored in the context of—financial regulation, is 
the norm of indirect other-regarding behavior.31  This norm directs us to 
consider the effects of our actions on others beyond our immediate 
counterparties (in economic parlance, the externalities of our actions), as 
 
work).  However, morality need not be religious: there is a long tradition of moral 
philosophy outside of the religious traditions, incorporating the works of Aristotle, Hobbes, 
Adam Smith, Hume, Kant, and Rawls, to name just a few.  See Robert C. Solomon, Free 
Enterprise, Sympathy and Virtue, in MORAL MARKETS: THE CRITICAL ROLE OF VALUES IN 
THE ECONOMY, supra note 22, at 16 (providing a reasonably brief review of the views of 
these thinkers, in the context of corporations and free enterprise). 
 25.  KAREN HO, LIQUIDATED: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF WALL STREET (2009). 
 26.  Lynn A. Stout, Taking Conscience Seriously, in MORAL MARKETS: THE CRITICAL 
ROLE OF VALUES IN THE ECONOMY, supra note 21, at 157, 162 [hereinafter Stout, MORAL 
MARKETS]; Zak, supra note 21, at 259, 273.  
 27.  Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 909 
(1996) 
 28.  Stout, MORAL MARKETS, supra note 26, at 162. 
 29.  “The norms embodied in this legal regime include honesty, fair dealing, and 
investor protection.” Short, supra note 23, at 501. 
 30.  See, e.g., TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY: AMERICA’S BUSINESS CULTURE 
AT A CROSSROAD (2006) (arguing that the lack of trust and honesty in the financial industry 
has detrimental consequences on the economy and suggesting that Americans can reverse 
the trend by “demand[ing] of their leaders and of each other more honesty and less 
cynicism, more trust and less doubting”). 
 31.  “Even with spatial and temporal distance, others’ emotions are felt in ourselves and 
influence our behavior.”  Zak, supra note 21, at 267; “Universal moral values . . . reflect . . . 
direct concern for the concrete welfare of other living, breathing humans in one’s 
community.  At this level, morality is both an important concept and a widely shared one.”  
Stout, MORAL MARKETS, supra note 26, at 163.  This more expansive notion of indirect 
other-regarding behavior becomes particularly important when people have no choice as to 
participation in a system: they can choose not to deal with people they deem dishonest or 
untrustworthy, but it is much more difficult to opt out of an entire financial system and 
economy that are callous to their needs. 
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opposed to the norm of honesty, which tends to be assessed by its impact 
on others with whom we have some type of direct connection (i.e. honest 
people tell the truth to others).32 
Honesty is recognized as being essential to economic interactions: if 
an actor is perceived to be lacking in honesty, others will not have the 
confidence to engage in transactions with that actor without expensive 
verification mechanisms.33  While these increased transaction costs are 
certainly important for individual transactions, they can also become 
significant from a systemic perspective when instances of dishonest 
behavior become so prevalent (or are perceived to have become so 
prevalent) that transaction costs are increased for everyone, even where 
both counterparties are honest.  In such a systemic context, failure to think 
more expansively about externalities (in this case, the increased transaction 
costs for “others” resulting from a systemic lack of confidence precipitated 
by one’s dishonest actions)34 violates the norm of indirect other-regarding 
behavior. 
Regrettably, this norm of indirect other-regarding behavior appears to 
have been displaced, or at least to have mutated, in the prevailing culture of 
Wall Street today.35  One landmark ethnographic study of Wall Street 
institutions has found that the employees of such institutions are motivated 
almost entirely by short-term profits,36 which “generat[es] pressure to . . . 
ignore the societal impact of their risk-taking.”37  This does not necessarily 
demonstrate a complete lack of concern for everyone: to the extent that 
risky behavior drives up short-term institutional profits, it could be said to 
 
 32.  Tamar Frankel, Trust, Honesty and Ethics in Business, 31-32 FIN. & COMMON 
GOOD (BIEN COMMUN) 87, 88 (2008), http://www.tamarfrankel.com/support-
files/financeandcommongood.pdf. 
 33.  Ronald J. Colombo, The Role of Trust in Financial Regulation, 55 VILL. L. REV. 
577, 579 (2010). 
 34.  James A. Fanto, Surveillant and Counselor: A Reorientation in Compliance for 
Financial Firms 20 (Brooklyn Law Sch. Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 358, 2013), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2321317. 
 35.  Cultures can evolve in ways that suppress universal moral norms like empathy and 
guilt.  Frankel, supra note 32, at 89.  
 36.  Karen Ho’s ethnography of Wall Street bankers depicts an industry that has a laser-
like focus on short-term market movements, rather than on long-term consequences for 
those outside of the markets.  (cited in Langevoort, supra note 17, at 1233).  More recently, 
an independent report on Barclays found that “[t]he culture that emerged [at the bank] 
tended to favor transactions over relationships, the short term over sustainability and 
financial over other business purposes.”  Mark Scott, Report Faults ‘at All Costs’ Attitude at 
Barclays That Encouraged Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2013, at B2, available at 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/04/03/report-faults-at-all-costs-attitude-at-barclays 
(quoting Anthony Salz, former head of the law firm Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer). 
 37.  Awrey et al., supra note 10, at 20. 
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be aligned with norms of promoting shareholder value38 (although there is a 
strong case that diversified financial institution shareholders are better 
served by financial stability than by outsized profits from those financial 
institutions).39  Members of the financial industry often demonstrate 
concern for their peers within the industry as well.40  However, when 
financial industry personnel engage in risky behavior for the single-minded 
purpose of increasing short-term profits, this evinces a lack of regard for 
people who are neither their peers nor shareholders in the financial 
institution, but who will (in the form of lost jobs and eviscerated retirement 
funds) bear the brunt of any financial instability caused by that institution.41  
To be clear, it is not the risk-taking in and of itself that is objectionable 
(after all, the financial industry came into being for the purpose of 
facilitating the prudent taking and managing of risks).  Instead, Wall Street 
behavior diverges from norms of indirect other-regarding behavior in its 
failure to consider the negative externalities of its risk-taking—particularly 
the consequences for those who have no direct relationship with the 
institution in question. 
A. Complexity and Leverage 
This Part will explore the process of financial innovation, and the use 
of very high leverage: two important examples of financial activities that 
generate large profits in the short-term, but which pose potentially huge 
problems for financial stability.  Whilst some amount of innovation, and 
some level of leverage, is integral to the proper functioning of the financial 
system, it is difficult to delineate in advance the ideal amounts of each.  
Innovation can facilitate broader economic growth by improving capital 
intermediation and risk management,42 and some level of leverage is 
 
 38.  “A second normative system governing behavior in the contemporary corporation 
is the maximization of shareholder value, narrowly conceived as wealth and often 
operationalized as short-term, quarter-to-quarter gains.”  Short, supra note 23, at 501.  
However, the quest for short-term profits can also be viewed more cynically as a pure 
promotion of personal self-interest.  Id. at 504. 
 39.  See infra note 199 and accompanying text (arguing that diversified shareholders are 
harmed more by systemic events than lower institutional profits). 
 40.  If a culture evolves so that a person’s peer group endorses their act, even if it 
violates broader social norms, then that person is more likely to be comfortable breaching 
those norms. Sunstein, supra note 27, at 940. 
 41.  “[T]he pain [resulting from financial instability] usually does not fall 
proportionately on those who made the mistakes in the first place”.  Stephen B. Young, 
Moral Capitalism and the Great Financial Meltdown of 2008, 33 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 
129, 139 (2009). 
 42.  Hilary J. Allen, A New Philosophy For Financial Stability Regulation, 45 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 173, 218-19 (2013) [hereinafter Allen, New Philosophy]. 
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essential to financial institutions’ abilities to provide liquidity and 
intermediate capital.43 But excessive amounts of either activity can 
destabilize our financial system. 
Financial innovation is potentially problematic because of its 
contribution to the increasing complexity of the financial system.  This 
complexity renders the system increasingly opaque to reasoned human 
cognition, making it more difficult to make thoughtful judgments about 
where risk lies.  Furthermore, the numerous linkages between financial 
institutions and products function as feedback loops that can speed up and 
amplify the transmission of shocks throughout the financial system.44  This 
increased speed further hampers the exercise of reasoned human judgment, 
necessitating reliance on shortcuts like cognitive heuristics and computer 
models, which tend to dismiss low-probability but high-consequence tail 
risks.45  Thus, when something unanticipated goes wrong (which may be as 
innocent as a fat finger error) the shock can reverberate through the system 
before anyone (regulators or market participants) can exercise reasoned 
human judgment about how to respond.  In place of reasoned judgment, 
correlated reliance on similar shortcuts can lead to the panicked herd 
behavior (particularly the destructive fire sales of financial assets) that 
precipitates financial instability.46 
Innovation of complex new financial products thus poses risks for 
financial stability.47  This is so even when the institutions that develop these 
products honestly disclose the inherent risks to investors: the new products 
 
 43.  RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL, JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW 
OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 40 (5th ed. 2013). 
 44.  Allen, New Philosophy, supra note 42, at 218-19.  This is particularly the case 
when there is a long chain of intermediaries involved, which increases reliance on short-
term funding (each link in the chain must use increasingly cheaper funding to make the 
transaction viable, and funding generally becomes cheaper when it is short-term, because of 
the lowered chance that something can go wrong in the brief period of exposure).  Increased 
reliance on short-term funding renders the financial system more fragile.  Kathryn Judge, 
Intermediary Influence, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015). 
 45.  “Individuals tend to ignore low probability catastrophic events.”  Henry T.C. Hu, 
Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure and the Promise of 
Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1488 (1993).  This very human tendency is 
exacerbated by over-reliance on computer-based mathematical models like “Value at Risk” 
or “VaR”, which tend to downplay tail risks.  See generally Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, 
and Open Source: The Outsourcing of Financial Regulation to Risk Models and the Global 
Financial Crisis, 84 WASH. L. REV. 127 (2009).   
 46.  Allen, New Philosophy, supra note 42, at 219. 
 47.  “In today’s financial marketplace, the biggest and potentially least understood 
systemic risks come from large-scale trading in highly complex derivatives, structured 
products, and other instruments of risk transfer used for sophisticated speculation and 
arbitrage.”  Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial 
Industry Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 478 (2011). 
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still add complexity and interconnectedness to the financial system, 
increasing the amount and obscuring the allocation of risk in the system as 
a whole.48  Some take the position that this is the necessary price to be paid 
for progress,49 but in fact there are many reasons to be skeptical of the 
benefits of financial innovation: innovation often serves the short-term 
interests of the firms who supply the innovations, rather than addressing 
any genuine societal needs for improved capital intermediation and/or risk 
management functions.50  To the extent that financial institutions develop 
complex financial products with little social utility in order to generate 
large fees (particularly when these products are rushed out without full 
appreciation of the risks they entail), financial innovation can be viewed as 
a failure of indirect other-regarding behavior.  There is a similar failure if 
an unnecessarily complex innovation has been engineered in order to 
confuse regulators, or to arbitrage regulatory requirements.  Despite being 
undesirable, however, such innovations are by no means illegal.51 
Financial innovations are often developed as a way of introducing new 
and unregulated types of leverage into the system.52  When financial 
institutions rely heavily on leverage,53 it increases their profits in good 
times, but makes them very vulnerable to external shocks.  If such a shock 
occurs, highly-leveraged institutions will likely need to sell their assets 
quickly,54 and this can depress asset prices system-wide, forcing other 
institutions to also deleverage by selling their assets (Brunnermeier has 
described this vicious cycle as a “fire sale externality”).55  Falling asset 
 
 48.  Allen, New Philosophy, supra note 42, at 218-21. 
 49.  See, e.g., ROBERT E. LITAN, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, IN DEFENSE OF MUCH, 
BUT NOT ALL, FINANCIAL INNOVATION (Feb. 17, 2010), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2010/2/17%20financial%20innovat
ion%20litan/0217_financial_innovation_litan.pdf. 
 50.  Dan Awrey, Complexity, Innovation, and the Regulation of Modern Financial 
Markets, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235, 262 (2012). 
 51.  Regulatory arbitrage is “a perfectly legal planning technique used to avoid . . . 
regulatory costs.”  Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 229 (2010). 
 52.  See, e.g., Geanakoplos’ discussion of how the innovation of the credit default swap 
created a new and almost limitless source of leverage in the financial system.  John 
Geanakoplos, The Leverage Cycle, 24 NBER MACROECONOMICS ANN. 2009, 1, 6 (2009). 
 53.  The less equity funding used to fund activities, the higher the debt funding and thus 
the higher the leverage.  Andrew W. Lo & Thomas J. Brennan, Do Labyrinthine Legal 
Limits on Leverage Lessen the Likelihood of Losses?  An Analytical Framework, 90 TEX. L. 
REV. 1775, 1780 (2012). 
 54.  “As different managers experience similar effects, they are likely to react in the 
same way by each selling assets, causing greater price volatility and prompting further sales.  
The result is a cascading decline in value, with greater coordination impairing each firm’s 
ability to manage its own risk exposure.”  Charles K. Whitehead, Destructive Coordination, 
96 CORNELL L. REV. 323, 326-27 (2011).  
 55.  Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-
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prices can damage confidence and cause financial institutions to become 
insolvent—with broad consequences for the availability of credit and 
payment systems to the economy as a whole.56 
Given these externalized costs of high leverage and instability, society 
is best served by financial institutions reducing their leverage profile.  To 
this end, international regulatory capital standards (the most recent iteration 
of which is known as “Basel III”) have been developed that require banks 
to maintain a minimum amount of equity (as opposed to debt) funding.57  
Basel III’s standards are complicated, but essentially they require banks to 
fund a minimum amount of their “risk-weighted assets” with equity or 
equity-like instruments, which are better able to absorb losses than debt.58  
Banks are able to arbitrage these regulatory capital rules, though, to allow 
them to hold lower amounts of equity than are required by the “spirit” of 
Basel III.  For example, over the years banks have innovated new products 
like trust preferred securities and contingent convertible bonds to satisfy 
regulatory capital requirements, notwithstanding that these innovative 
instruments are inferior to common equity in their ability to absorb any 
losses that the issuing financial institution may incur.59  In addition, 
different types of non-bank institutions (often referred to as “shadow 
banks”) have evolved since the advent of regulatory capital rules that 
provide banking-like services without having to comply with Basel III’s 
standards.60 
The banks that are required to comply with Basel III can also arbitrage 
those standards by manipulating the way they calculate their risk-weighted 
assets.  A bank can transfer its assets “off-balance sheet” so that they are 
excluded from its calculation of risk-weighted assets, or a bank can use 
proprietary internal models to assign low risk-weightings to its assets.61 
These techniques allow banks to report that they have fewer assets, with 
lower risk-weightings, which allows them to fund themselves with more 
 
2008, 23 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 77, 94 (2009). 
 56.  Allen, New Philosophy, supra note 48, at 183. 
 57.  BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL III: 
A GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS 
(2011). 
 58.  The Basel III international standards on capital adequacy (which are in the process 
of being implemented in most advanced economies) effectively require banks to fund at 
least 7.0% of their risk-weighed assets with common equity, and to fund another 3.5% of 
their risk weighted assets with equity-like instruments.  There are more stringent 
requirements for global systemically important banks.  Id. at 27-28. 
 59.  Hilary J. Allen, Let’s Talk About Tax: Fixing Bank Incentives to Sabotage Stability, 
18 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 821, 844-866 (2013) [hereinafter Allen, Let’s Talk About 
Tax]. 
 60.  Id. at 882-83. 
 61.  Id. at 832. 
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debt and less equity and thus increase their leverage (the amount of equity 
funding required is expressed as a percentage of risk-weighted assets).62  
Doing so is rarely fraudulent: because accounting methodologies and the 
attribution of risk to highly complex, often illiquid, financial assets are 
inherently subjective, and reflect the combined judgments of many 
different people working in a financial institution, it is very difficult to say 
that the results are not plausibly honest.  However, even though this type of 
arbitrage is legal, if a lack of concern for how others might be affected by 
the fruition of an institution’s risks results in consistently low reports of 
risk-weighted assets (and thus minimizes the amount of equity that the 
institution has available to absorb losses), then this evinces a failure of 
indirect other-regarding behavior.63 
B. The Pathologies of the Financial Crisis 
Unnecessarily high complexity and leverage, as well as some other 
failures of indirect other-regarding behavior, were key drivers of the 
Financial Crisis.  This Part will illustrate this idea with actual examples 
from the Financial Crisis.  However, this Part will start by examining 
someone who did not cause the Financial Crisis: Bernie Madoff.  Many 
people invested with Madoff in the years before the Financial Crisis, 
trusting that he was an honest money manager producing reasonable (if 
somewhat implausibly consistent) returns.64  When Madoff could no longer 
attract new investors during the Financial Crisis, it became apparent that he 
was operating a Ponzi scheme, and that he had defrauded investors of an 
estimated $64.8 billion.65  Madoff was charged with eleven felony counts, 
including securities, mail and wire fraud; he subsequently pled guilty to all 
 
 62.  Vanessa Le Leslé and Sofiya Avramova, Revisiting Risk-Weighted Assets 7 (IMF 
Working Paper 12/90, 2012). 
 63.  It should also be noted that while the Basel III standards are helpful, they do not 
come close to eliminating the externalities caused by financial institution leverage.  Basel III 
does not apply to most non-bank financial institutions, and even when it comes to banks, 
many economists dispute that the minimum levels of equity funding mandated by Basel III 
are sufficient.  For example, Admati and twenty other prominent economists have argued 
that banks should be required to fund at least 15% of their total (i.e. not risk-weighted) 
assets with common equity.  Admati et al., Healthy Banking System is the Goal, Not 
Profitable Banks, FINANCIAL TIMES, Nov. 9, 2010, available at, http://www.ft.com/intl/ 
cms/s/0/63fa6b9e-eb8e-11df-bbb5-00144feab49a.html#axzz3PtCHWUlj.  Given the 
limitations of the Basel III standards, society is largely forced to depend on financial 
institutions’ own judgments about what level of leverage is appropriate, and instability is 
much more likely if those judgments are entirely self-interested. 
 64.  Felicia Smith, Madoff Ponzi Scheme Exposes the Myth of the Sophisticated 
Investor, 40 U. BALT. L. REV. 215, 229 (2010). 
 65.  Id. at 226. 
ARTICLE 4 (ALLEN).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/16/15  11:49 AM 
876 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 17:3 
 
charges, and was sentenced to 150 years in prison for his dishonest and 
criminal behavior.66  While Madoff’s failures of honesty and 
trustworthiness were devastating for those who had invested with him, they 
did not really compromise the stability of the financial system more 
broadly.67  At worst, Madoff’s fund—and the numerous other Ponzi 
schemes that have come to light in the last few years—may have 
contributed to a general sense that the financial markets were unfair and 
therefore not deserving of confidence,68 but these Ponzi schemes can more 
accurately be described as being exposed by financial instability, rather 
than causing it. 
The sheer scope of the Financial Crisis suggests that it could not have 
been caused entirely by the actions of a few “bad apples.”69  Instead, the 
actions that caused the greatest harm in the Financial Crisis were in many 
cases not fraudulent (or if they were fraudulent, the real harm that they 
caused went far beyond harm to the people who were deceived and 
cheated).  The more plausible narrative of the Financial Crisis is that the 
financial industry had a self-interested culture that encouraged many 
people, who would probably consider themselves very honest and 
trustworthy,70 to disregard the externalities of their actions.  This point is 
perhaps best illustrated by considering the mortgage-backed securitization 
(“MBS”) bubble that precipitated the Financial Crisis. 
 
 66.  Id.at 215, 221-22. 
 67.  Indeed neither Madoff’s nor any other Ponzi scheme even rates a mention in the 
FCIC Report on the causes of the Financial Crisis.  That is not to say that the failure of 
Madoff’s fund did not cause any negative externalities: in particular, many universities and 
non-profit organizations were devastated by losses resulting from Madoff’s fraud.  Id. at 
232.  The point being made is that the externalities caused by interruptions to university and 
non-profit activities did not include any consequences for financial stability. 
 68.  Id. at 231. 
 69.  Persaud notes that “We must continue to clamp down on fraud and ethical abuses 
and promote transparency, but this is not enough to avoid crises.”  Avinash Persaud, Macro-
Prudential Regulation: Fixing Fundamental Market (and Regulatory) Failures, CRISIS 
RESPONSE (The World Bank Grp., Wash., D.C.), July 2009, at 7, available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTFINANCIALSECTOR/Resources/282884-
1303327122200/Note6.pdf.  In a similar vein, Coffee has stated in relation to the Enron 
scandal that “No doubt, there were some rogues and some particularly bad boards.  Yet the 
most reliable evidence, when properly read, suggests that Enron and related scandals were 
neither unique nor idiosyncratic; rather, pervasive problems arose that undercut existing 
systems of corporate governance.”  Symposium, What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and 
Economic History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269, 270 (2004).   
 70.  “Personal greed perhaps, a lack of sufficient scrutiny of the company’s affairs, an 
insensitivity or an indifference to public opinion, these charges could be leveled against 
some corporate leaders, but few, thankfully, are guilty of deliberate fraud or wickedness.  At 
worst they were only playing the game according to the rules as they understood them.”  
Charles Handy, What’s a Business For?, in MORAL MARKETS: THE CRITICAL ROLE OF 
VALUES IN THE ECONOMY 329 (Paul J. Zak ed., 2008). 
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In the late 1990s, the market for non-traditional residential mortgages 
began to grow in earnest.71  Mortgage lenders engaged mortgage brokers to 
market these non-traditional mortgages to borrowers, but the mortgage 
brokers were in no way incentivized to ensure that borrowers could repay 
their mortgages.  In fact, they were often rewarded through use of a 
commission known as a “yield spread premium” to steer borrowers towards 
more expensive mortgages.72  The mortgage lenders were unconcerned 
about the borrowers’ ability to repay, because those lenders did not retain 
any of the risk that the mortgages might default: the mortgages were 
immediately sold to Wall Street firms (which relied heavily on leverage to 
purchase these and other assets).  The Wall Street firms were unconcerned 
about underwriting standards for the mortgages, because they immediately 
packaged the mortgages into complex MBSs and then sold them to 
investors.73  Even when Wall Street firms kept MBSs on their books, they 
were still unconcerned about the quality of the underlying mortgages 
because they had engineered the MBSs (and layered credit default swaps 
on top of them) in a way that purported to reduce—or even eliminate—the 
default risk inherent in the individual underlying mortgages.74 
Because the real risks inherent in these MBSs were obscured by 
complex financial engineering (and because regulators acquiesced in the 
view that MBSs were not risky investments), investors were not 
compensated for the risk they were acquiring, and the securities were 
“over-issued relative to what would be possible under rational 
expectations.”75  The demand for MBSs generated demand for more and 
more mortgages, with the result that mortgages were issued to even riskier 
borrowers who did not necessarily understand the terms of the exotic 
mortgages they were entering into, and who (in many cases) could not hope 
to be able to repay the mortgages if the values of their homes were to fall.  
This drove up real estate prices, and made the MBSs backed by those 
mortgages even riskier.  This securitization process thus inflated both a real 
estate bubble and a bubble in MBSs themselves, and there were systemic 
reverberations when these bubbles popped, precipitating the Financial 
Crisis.  In particular, the markets lost confidence in financial institutions 
 
 71.  These mortgages included subprime mortgages for borrowers with weak credit, and 
for all types of borrowers, riskier mortgages with exotic features that allowed for negative 
amortization.  FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 88, 102 
(2011) [hereinafter, the “FCIC Report”]. 
 72.  Id. at 90.   
 73.  Kathleen C. Engel and Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street 
Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2040-41 (2007). 
 74.  FCIC Report, supra note 71, at 42-35. 
 75.  Nicola Gennaioli, Andrei Shleifer and & Robert Vishny, Neglected Risks, 
Financial Innovation, and Financial Fragility, 104 J. FIN. ECON. 452, 454 (2012). 
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that had large exposure to MBSs (or to credit default swaps used to hedge 
exposure to MBSs), like Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, Citibank, and 
AIG.  Because these firms relied so heavily on short-term debt to fund their 
usual operations, once they lost the confidence of their funders, they 
quickly lost the ability to carry on business.  The U.S. Government then 
stepped in to assist these institutions (with the notable exception of Lehman 
Brothers), but was unable to inspire confidence sufficient to immediately 
restore the normal workings of the financial system.  The result was a 
credit crunch that stalled broader economic growth. 
So which moral failings were at work here?76  Individual mortgage 
brokers who marketed predatory loans did have personal relationships with 
potential mortgagors, and they abused the trust reposed in them when they 
engaged in dishonest sales tactics that hid risks from those mortgagors.77  
These types of behaviors could therefore properly be characterized as 
fraudulent, and they have often been the subject of criminal sanctions and 
private lawsuits.78  But not only did many brokers disregard the interests of 
those they dealt with directly, they also disregarded the impact of their 
activities on society more broadly.  In fact, by marketing these predatory 
loans, mortgage brokers were artificially inflating home prices, thereby 
fuelling a destabilizing asset bubble that would eventually hurt everyone 
when it popped.  However, it is quite plausible that most mortgage brokers 
did not comprehend the systemic harm that their activities, when 
aggregated with similar behavior by other mortgage brokers, might do to 
financial stability more generally.  If it is true that mortgage brokers did not 
understand the impact of their activities on society more broadly, then we 
cannot characterize their actions as a failure of indirect other-regarding 
behavior – in such an instance, it is fair to say that there is a pure cognitive 
failure rather than any moral failure.79 
While it would be harder for the Wall Street firms, which made the 
mortgages and packaged them into MBSs,80 to assert that they were 
 
 76.  While this Article is focused on the financial industry’s contribution to instability, 
the U.S. federal financial regulatory agencies should not entirely escape blame for the MBS 
bubble.  See Part IV.C infra (discussing how financial regulators failed to take steps that 
might have mitigated the Crisis). 
 77.  Kevin T. Jackson, The Scandal Beneath the Financial Crisis: Getting a View from 
a Moral-Cultural Mental Model, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 735, 762 (2010). 
 78.  The Department of Justice has made available on its website a sample of 
documents relating to civil and criminal mortgage fraud prosecutions. See, e.g., Sample 
Documents, U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE E. DIST. PA., http://www.justice.gov/usao/pae/ 
Mortgage_Task_Force/sampledocs.html (last visited May 9, 2015).  
 79.  Where there is a purely cognitive failure, changing cultural norms to encourage 
more other-regarding behavior will have no impact.   
 80.  By the time of the Financial Crisis, many of the lenders that made the mortgage 
loans had been subsumed into Wall Street conglomerates.  FCIC Report, supra note 71, at 
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completely ignorant of the potential externalities of their actions, it is 
nonetheless true that many on Wall Street underappreciated the risks 
inherent in MBSs.  This was in large part a result, however, of a conscious 
strategy by these same Wall Street firms to create opaquely complex 
financial products (MBSs had been specifically engineered as securities 
with only a low probability of default, and humans have a natural tendency 
to underestimate the risk—often referred to as “tail risk”—of low-
probability, but potentially high-impact, events).81  Furthermore, many did 
try to alert Wall Street to the problems with MBSs: voices warned about 
the securitization bubble prior to the Financial Crisis,82 and significant short 
positions were taken against MBSs (and securities backed by other, more 
complex assets connected with the mortgage markets).83  The problem was 
that these warnings about financial instability were largely ignored, in part 
because of moral failings.  The financial industry’s desire for short-term 
profits, and disregard for externalities borne by those outside of the 
financial system, ensured that the MBS machine continued to churn on 
even when there were clear warnings of the MBS market’s destabilizing 
potential. 
Wall Street’s attitude was epitomized by a new acronym “IBGYBG” 
(short for “I’ll be gone, you’ll be gone”), coined in the heat of the MBS 
bubble to describe deals that “brought in big fees up front while risking 
much larger losses in the future.”84  This lack of moral compunction with 
respect to the MBS market was also on display in a quote from Armand 
Pastine, a Managing Director of a CDO issuer, reported in May of 2005: he 
stated, “[t]o suggest that CDO managers would pull out of an economically 
viable deal for moral reasons — that’s a cop-out ”.85  That Pastine 
repudiated morality does not mean that he was not also affected by 
 
88-89. 
 81.  See supra note 45 (citing materials for the proposition that individuals tend to 
ignore low probability catastrophic events).  
 82.  Engel & McCoy, supra note 73; Raghuram G. Rajan, Has Financial Development 
Made the World Riskier?, in THE GREENSPAN ERA: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE, A SYMPOSIUM 
SPONSORED BY THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY, JACKSON HOLE, WYOMING, 
AUGUST 25-27, 2005 (Alan Greenspan ed., Fed. Reserve Bank of Kan. City 2005). 
 83.  See Michael Lewis, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE (2010) 
(presenting an extremely entertaining account of the people who bet against the MBS 
bubble). 
 84.  FCIC Report, supra note 71, at 8. 
 85.  Allison Pyburn, CDO Investors Debate Morality of Spread Environment, ASSET 
SECURITIZATION REPORT, May 9, 2005, at 1.  It should be noted, though, that there were 
some bond managers who took “the high road . . . .”  PIMCO, for example, announced that 
it would withdraw from the MBS market because the rates being paid on bonds were 
insufficient to compensate investors for the risk inherent in such bonds, given the lack of 
historical performance data for subprime mortgages, and credit ratings that were too lax.  Id. 
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cognitive failures.  In a statement ripe with hubris, Pastine also noted his 
(disastrously incorrect) view that “some of the investors are 
underestimating the stamina and resiliency of the residential mortgage 
market in the U.S. — particularly in light of the new products available to 
more residential consumers along the entire credit spectrum.”86  
Nonetheless, Pastine’s complete disregard for morality in the context of 
financial business is indicative of a broader cultural issue.  He, and many 
others, thought it was preposterous to even consider the moral implications 
of mortgage-backed securitization. 
Admittedly, when Pastine was quoted in May of 2005, the MBS 
bubble had reached such frenzied proportions that the profits to be made by 
participating would have been difficult to give up, even if industry 
personnel had felt some moral disquiet about the danger the bubble posed 
for financial stability––as Chuck Prince famously said, “[a]s long as the 
music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance”.87  But earlier in the 
decade, when the MBS market was less frothy, dancing was less of a 
necessity: it is not unreasonable to suggest that financial institutions should 
have adopted a more circumspect and prudent approach to the creation, 
promotion and purchase of MBSs at that stage, which would have 
mitigated the growth of the bubble in the long-run.88  However, the 
financial industry was so focused on short-term profits (especially the fee 
income associated with the mortgage backed securitization process) that it 
did not consider the long-term consequences of its activities for financial 
stability.89 
In the wake of the Financial Crisis, some members of the financial 
industry have recognized their failures of indirect other-regarding 
behavior.90  By and large, however, the gravity of the Financial Crisis has 
 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Dealbook, Citi Chief on Buyouts: ‘We’re Still Dancing’, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 
2007, available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2007/07/10/citi-chief-on-buyout-loans-
were-still-dancing/?_r=0. 
 88.  Financial intermediaries assist in the creation of asset bubbles: they promote the 
products because of the fee income associated with those products, and there is little check 
on the quality or quantity of products issued because the financial intermediary has no skin 
in the game.  See Young, supra note 41, at 138 (discussing factors that lead to asset 
bubbles).  Pistor has emphasized that instability becomes built-in to the system at the time of 
contracting, so that is the key point at which other-regarding behavior is most important.  
Katharina Pistor, A Legal Theory of Finance, 41 J. COMP. ECON., 315, 327 (2013),.   
 89.  See Kling, supra note 17, at 508 (discussing the misalignment of incentives in the 
financial industry that led to the Financial Crisis). 
 90.  In the aftermath of the Financial Crisis, Bank of America CEO Brian Moynihan 
testified that “[o]ver the course of the crisis, we, as an industry, caused a lot of damage.  
Never has it been clearer how poor business judgments we have made have affected Main 
Street.” FCIC Report, supra note 71, at 389. 
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not inspired the moral contrition that one might have expected. In fact, 
many in the industry have come to see themselves as being persecuted for 
failures of indirect other-regarding behavior that they view as simply being 
part of their job.91  Furthermore, financial innovation and use of high levels 
of leverage continue largely unabated.  The financial industry’s failures of 
other-regarding behavior cannot be blamed entirely on a pre-Crisis bubble 
mentality.  They reflect deep-seated cultural problems that have persisted 
even through the Financial Crisis and the recession that followed.92 
The industry’s lack of remorse has no doubt exacerbated the public 
desire for some form of reprisal, but while some MBS-related fraud has 
been prosecuted in the aftermath of the Financial Crisis,93 almost no 
criminal charges have been levied against financial institutions—or their 
senior managers—for actually causing the MBS bubble.94  Particularly 
galling for many is the fact that no executive of Lehman Brothers has been 
charged with any crime.  This was not for want of trying: prosecutors 
appear to have expended great effort in investigating potential leads.95  But 
while Lehman Brothers’ management and employees certainly exhibited 
failures of indirect other-regarding behavior (for example, by using high 
 
 91.  As a hyperbolic example of this mentality, in an interview with the Wall Street 
Journal, Robert Benmosche of AIG stated: “[t]he uproar over bonuses ‘was intended to stir 
public anger, to get everybody out there with their pitch forks and their hangman nooses, 
and all that–sort of like what we did in the Deep South [decades ago].  And I think it was 
just as bad and just as wrong.’” Leslie Scism, AIG’s Benmosche and Miller on Villains, 
Turnarounds and Those Bonuses, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 23, 2013, 2:32 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/09/23/aigs-benmosche-and-miller-on-villains-
turnarounds-and-those-bonuses/tab/print/. 
 92.  See infra Part II.C (discussing pathologies since the Financial Crisis). 
 93.  The Department of Justice reported that in 2012, for example, 107 criminal 
defendants were charged with fraud relating to homeowners distressed by the Financial 
Crisis.  Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force Members 
Reveal Results of Distressed Homeowner Initiative, (Oct. 9, 2012), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/October/12-ag-1216.html. 
 94.  No Crime, No Punishment, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2012 at SR10, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/26/opinion/sunday/no-crime-no-punishment.html. 
 The criminal prosecution of two former Bear Stearns hedge fund managers for securities 
fraud was the highest profile criminal case arising out of the Crisis, but they were acquitted.  
Zachery Kouwe and Dan Slater, 2 Bear Stearns Fund Leaders Are Acquitted, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 11, 2009 at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/11/business/ 
11bear.html.  Even if the hedge fund managers had been found guilty, their crime would 
have been deceiving their investors, rather than contributing to financial instability by 
exacerbating a bubble in complex mortgage-backed financial products.  Press Release, U.S. 
Attorney’s Office for the E. Dist. of N.Y., Two Senior Managers Of Failed Bear Stearns 
Hedge Funds Indicted On Conspiracy And Fraud Charges (June 19, 2008), 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nye/pr/2008/2008jun19.html. 
 95.  Ben Protess & Susanne Craig, Inside the End of the U.S. Bid to Get Lehman, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 9, 2013, available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/09/08/inside-the-end-
of-the-u-s-bid-to-punish-lehman-executives/. 
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levels of leverage to purchase illiquid complex assets like MBSs),96 there 
was little evidence of behavior that was actually fraudulent.  As Jed Rakoff 
has noted, “If the Great Recession was in no part the handiwork of 
intentionally fraudulent practices by high-level executives, then to 
prosecute such executives criminally would be ‘scapegoating’ of the most 
shallow and despicable kind.”97  The one potentially shady practice 
identified by Anton Valukas, the Lehman Brothers’ Examiner, was 
Lehman’s use of the “Repo 105” accounting manoeuver to “temporarily 
remove $50 billion of assets from its balance sheet at first and second 
quarter ends in 2008 so that it could report significantly lower net leverage 
numbers than reality.”98  Ultimately, though, prosecutors concluded that 
this accounting practice was technically legal.99 Regardless, the Repo 105 
transactions were not destabilizing in and of themselves, but were used to 
hide destabilizing actions (like highly-leveraged purchases of MBSs) that 
had already been taken.100 
Notwithstanding the dearth of criminal proceedings, an infinite array 
of civil claims has been filed in connection with the MBS bubble.101 These 
include claims alleging predatory conduct by mortgage lenders towards 
mortgagors;102 securities fraud claims alleging that financial institutions 
made misleading and deceptive statements to investors in connection with 
the sale of MBSs;103 securities fraud claims brought by shareholders in 
 
 96.  Examiner’s Report of Anton R. Valukas at 22, In re Lehman Bros. Holdings, 439 
B.R. 811  (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (Nos. 08-13555, 08-13888). 
 97.  Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been 
Prosecuted?, N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS, Jan. 9, 2014, at 4. 
 98.  Examiner’s Report, supra note 96, at 19. 
 99.  Protess & Craig, supra note 95. 
 100.  See Examiner’s Report, supra note 96, at 22. 
 101.  This paragraph does not provide an exhaustive list of the types of claims that have 
been brought.  One of the more creative claims filed with regard to the MBS bubble alleged 
that “subprime foreclosures constituted a public nuisance caused by defendant financial 
institutions’ securitization practices”.  See Christopher J. Miller, “Don’t Blame Me, Blame 
the Financial Crisis”: A Survey of Dismissal Rulings in 10b-5 Suits for Subprime Securities 
Losses, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 273, 275 (2011) for a discussion of City of Cleveland v. 
Ameriquest Mortg. Sec., Inc., 615 F.3d 496 (6th Cir. 2010).  For a more comprehensive 
account of Crisis-related litigation, see David Zaring, Litigating the Financial Crisis, 100 
VA. L. REV. 1405, 1469 (2014) (discussing the characteristics and kinds of crisis-related 
litigation using Citigroup’s suit against Wells Fargo as an example).   
 102.  For example, in October 2012, a class action was filed by the ACLU alleging that 
Morgan Stanley had disproportionately targeted African Americans borrowers with high-
cost and high-risk residential mortgages.  Jessica Silver-Greenberg, A.C.L.U. Filing Suit 
Over Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2012, at B1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/15/business/aclu-to-sue-morgan-stanley-over-mortgage-
loans.html.  
 103.  For a discussion of claims brought by the SEC in connection with misleading 
statements made to MBS investors, see Peter J Henning, Mixed Results for S.E.C. in 
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financial institutions alleging misleading and deceptive statements (for 
example, that the institutions misrepresented the strength of their mortgage 
underwriting standards or their exposure to subprime mortgages);104 and 
claims alleging breach of fiduciary duties by financial institution boards for 
failing to monitor their institution’s risk exposures.105  Some of these claims 
have succeeded, but many have proven unsuccessful because of difficulties 
in establishing scienter and causation,106 and because of courts’ reluctance 
to hold financial institution boards liable for failing to monitor business 
risk.107  Even if more of these claims had succeeded, however, they would 
 
Financial Crisis Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/ 
2012/11/19/mixed-results-for-s-e-c-in-financial-crisis-cases/.  The SEC’s settlement with 
Goldman Sachs over the CDO referred to as “ABACUS 2007-AC1” is illustrative: the SEC 
filed a complaint against Goldman Sachs alleging that “marketing materials for ABACUS 
2007-ACI ‘were false and misleading because they represented that ACA selected the 
reference portfolio while omitting any mention that Paulson, a party with economic interests 
adverse to CDO investors, played a significant role in the selection of the reference 
portfolio.’”  Jonathan Fisher, Claire Cregan, James di Giulio & Jodi Schutze, Economic 
Crime and the Global Financial Crisis, 5 LAW & FIN. MKT. REV. 276, 278 (2011).  Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac, the largest MBS investors in the U.S., have also “accused the banks 
of duping the housing giants into buying $200 billion of mortgage securities that ultimately 
imploded during the financial crisis”.  Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Banks Seek to Overturn 
Judge’s Ruling in a Mortgage Case, N.Y. TIMES , Mar. 28, 2013, at B10 available at 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/03/27/banks-seek-to-overturn-judges-ruling-in-critical-
mortgage-case/. 
 104.  For a rare example of a successful suit in this vein, see In re Countrywide Fin. 
Corp. Sec. Litig., 588 F. Supp.2d 1132 (C.D. Cal. 2008).  Courts have generally dismissed 
such claims. See Hurt, infra note 290, at 267 (discussing how the Southern District of New 
York has not seen a large number of successful suits against financial institutions). 
 105.  These claims are usually framed as failure of the board’s duty to oversee or 
monitor the financial institution.  See, e.g., In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 
964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“[A]lleging that directors breached their fiduciary duties by 
failing to adequately protect corporation from exposure to subprime lending market, and 
alleging that directors engaged in waste.”).  However, other types of fiduciary duty claims 
(including breach of the duty of care) have also been (unsuccessfully) alleged in the wake of 
the Crisis.  See, e.g., In re The Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. S’holder Litig., 2011 WL 4826104 
(Del. Ch. 2011) (“[A]lleging that [directors] breached their fiduciary duties by failing to 
properly analyze and rationally set compensation levels for corporate employees, by 
committing waste, . . . and by failing to adequately monitor the corporation’s operations.”).  
For a discussion of these claims, see Hurt, infra note 290 at 275–79. 
 106.  One survey of 10b-5 claims brought in the wake of the Financial Crisis found that 
“Scienter has been the major hurdle for plaintiffs in financial crisis-related suits under 
Section 10b and Rule 10b-5: in the cases examined, only one court that found the plaintiff’s 
scienter allegations sufficient ultimately dismissed the complaint for failure to plead loss 
causation.”  Miller, supra note 101, at 304.  For a discussion of the difficulties associated 
with establishing liability for consumer claims relating to securitized mortgages, see 
Kathleen C. Engel & Thomas J. Fitzpatrick IV, Complexity, Complicity, and Liability Up 
the Securitization Food Chain: Investor and Arranger Exposure to Consumer Claims, 2 
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 345 (2012). 
 107.  See Symposium, A Board’s Duty to Monitor, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 717, 739 
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have enforced only the interests of mortgagors, MBS investors, or financial 
institution shareholders.  The brunt of the collapse of the financial system 
was borne by people who had never even heard of MBSs, and who may not 
have had mortgages or even bank accounts,108 let alone shares in financial 
institutions.109 
C. Pathologies Since the Financial Crisis 
The preceding discussion focused on moral failings in the lead-up to 
the Financial Crisis.  Some have argued that the Financial Crisis was the 
proverbial “100 Year Storm”, and thus unrepresentative of how the 
financial industry usually works.110  Others thought that the Financial Crisis 
was a product of a broken Wall Street culture, but hoped that the magnitude 
of the Financial Crisis would prompt a change in that culture.  
Unfortunately, it appears that potentially destabilizing behaviors, as well as 
the financial industry’s failure to consider the interests of society, persist 
and are endemic.  The losses suffered by JPMorgan’s Chief Investment 
Office (“CIO”) in 2012 (known colloquially as the “London Whale” 
episode) are case in point. 
By way of background, the CIO, which was created to invest the 
bank’s excess deposits, started trading credit derivatives in 2006111 (the 
stated purpose of the CIO’s credit derivatives portfolio was to “hedge” or 
 
(2009) ( “[E]valuating the board’s success at monitoring business risk would . . . unleash the 
dangers of hindsight bias.”). 
 108.  In 2011, 8.2% of households had no bank accounts – many of these were lower 
income and unemployed households. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 2011 NATIONAL SURVEY OF 
UNBANKED AND UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS 3-4 (2012).   
 109.  For an anecdotal description of the impact of the Financial Crisis on lower income 
and unemployed households, see Ronald A. Wilson, The View From South Tucson: How the 
Economic Crisis Affects Defendants in My Courtroom, 48 JUDGES J. 14 (2009).   
 110.  For example, in testimony before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 
Goldman Sachs CEO Lloyd Blankfein stated “After the shocks of recent months and the 
associated economic pain, there is a natural and appropriate desire for wholesale reform. We 
should resist a response, however, that is solely designed around protecting us from the 100-
year storm.”  Lloyd C. Blankfein, Chairman and CEO, The Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 
Testimony Before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 12 (Jan. 13, 2010), http://fcic-
static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-testimony/2010-0113-Blankfein.pdf. 
 111.  STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS. 113TH CONG., JPMORGAN 
CHASE WHALE TRADES: A CASE HISTORY OF DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES 3 (2013) 
[hereinafter, Senate Report].  The most commonly traded form of credit derivative is a credit 
default swap, or CDS, which provides protection with respect to default risk on an 
underlying debt instrument, such as a bond.  Other, more complicated types of credit 
derivatives, reference indices of debt instruments instead of a single debt instrument.  Id. at 
30-34. 
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offset JPMorgan’s other credit risks in the long-term).112  In the first quarter 
of 2012, the CIO was directed to reduce its risk-weighted assets – instead 
of doing so by selling off the riskiest derivative assets in its portfolio, the 
CIO opted to retain those assets and enter into additional risky derivatives 
designed to offset its existing derivative assets (thus increasing the size and 
risk of the total portfolio, and nullifying the hedging benefit of the 
derivatives already in its portfolio).113  The portfolio started to lose value 
rapidly, even as its size was being expanded: in March 2012 alone, $40 
billion of credit derivatives were purchased for the portfolio, and the 
portfolio reported $550 million of losses.114  The CIO had a number of risk 
limits in place that were intended to alert the CIO if the derivatives and 
other assets it held became too risky, and these risk limits were breached at 
least 330 times in the first four months of 2012.  However, these breaches 
were either ignored, or the risk limits were themselves adjusted to allow the 
portfolio to be operated as before.115  Trading was finally halted in late 
March, but losses continued to grow – by the end of 2012, the portfolio was 
reported as having lost $6.2 billion in total.116 
Fortunately, the losses occasioned by the CIO’s trades were 
insufficiently large to have any systemic effect.  However, the Senate 
report into the CIO’s losses appreciates the true systemic significance of 
the episode: “The bank’s actions not only exposed the many risk 
management deficiencies at JPMorgan Chase, but also raise systemic 
concerns about how many other financial institutions may be disregarding 
risk indicators and manipulating models to artificially lower risk results and 
capital requirements.”117  While cognitive failures were certainly at work 
here – JPMorgan would not have continued its trading strategy if the 
traders and their managers didn’t think that the trades would eventually 
become profitable – willfully misvaluing investments and ignoring risk 
limits is symptomatic of an industry culture that, despite the lessons of the 
Financial Crisis, continues to exalt short-term profit to the potential 
detriment of long-term stability.  As we have seen repeatedly, this lack of 
regard for others cannot be attributed only to “bad apples” or “rogue 
traders”.118  Instead, the traders within the CIO (including Bruno Iksil, the 
so-called “London Whale”) consummated their trades openly and with the 
blessing of some of the bank’s most senior managers, all of whom were 
 
 112.  Id. at 4, 12. 
 113.  Id. at 3. 
 114.  Id. at 4. 
 115.  Id. at 7. 
 116.  Id. at 4. 
 117.  Id. at 8. 
 118.  Id. at 14. 
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therefore complicit in ignoring the breaches of risk metrics by the CIO’s 
credit derivatives portfolio.  For example, for four days in January 2012, 
the portfolio breached the acceptable Value-at-Risk limit not only for the 
portfolio, but for the whole bank, and the breach was reported all the way 
up to Jamie Dimon, CEO of JPMorgan.119  Yet the CIO continued its 
trading strategy unchastened until late March.  As the Senate report puts it, 
JPMorgan (which actually has the reputation of being one of the most 
careful of the Wall Street firms)120 has a “culture in which risk limit 
breaches were routinely disregarded, risk metrics were frequently criticized 
or downplayed, and risk evaluation models were targeted by bank 
personnel seeking to produce artificially lower capital requirements.”121 
JPMorgan appears to have displayed some dishonesty here: the Senate 
report recounts at length the ways in which the bank misinformed investors 
and the public about its losses.122  In terms of financial stability, however, 
the more culpable behavior is JPMorgan breaching internal risk protocols 
rather than how subsequent losses were reported to investors and the 
public.  Once a highly-leveraged financial institution sustains sufficient 
losses, it is likely to lose the confidence of, and thus short-term funding 
from, other financial institutions: the experience of Bear Stearns and 
Lehman Brothers shows that once confidence is lost, financial institution 
failure can be precipitous, and contagious.123  Internal risk protocols are 
designed to stop an institution from incurring such losses in the first place, 
and thus protect both the institution and the system as a whole.  Public 
disclosures regarding losses occasioned by risky conduct will do nothing to 
reduce those losses, and such disclosures may in fact precipitate 
institutional failure by damaging confidence in the institution.  Thus, as far 
as financial stability is concerned, the moral failing here was not one of 
dishonesty in public disclosures, but a failure to appreciate the potential 
consequences for others of JPMorgan making investments that its own 
internal systems had identified as too risky. 
Although JPMorgan’s public disclosure failures were not problematic 
from a financial stability perspective, hiding information about the CIO’s 
risks and losses from JPMorgan’s regulators (primarily the OCC) could 
have proved destabilizing.  Regulators rely on real-time information from 
large institutions to make judgment calls about the risks faced by such 
 
 119.  Id. at 7. 
 120.  See Henry T. C. Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, “Pure Information,” and 
the SEC Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1671-1672 (2012) (“Dimon and JPM 
were so respected that they were at the vanguard of the financial services industry to fend 
off the impact of Dodd-Frank.”). 
 121.  Senate Report, supra note 111, at 7. 
 122.  Id. at 14.  
 123.  Allen, Let’s Talk About Tax, supra note 59, at 864-65. 
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institutions, and the financial system as a whole.  Because JPMorgan was 
not entirely forthcoming in its dealings with regulators,124 the OCC had 
limited information on which to determine whether regulatory intervention 
was required.  It is appropriate, then, that the Attorney-General, the 
Manhattan U.S. Attorney and the FBI Assistant Director-In-Charge,125 as 
well as the SEC,126 have charged two JPMorgan derivatives traders with 
fraudulent valuations, false filings and the keeping of false books and 
records.  In a similar vein, the SEC reached a settlement with JPMorgan, 
which extracted civil penalties as well as a rare admission of wrongdoing 
for “misstating financial results and lacking effective internal controls to 
detect and prevent its traders from fraudulently overvaluing investments to 
conceal hundreds of millions of dollars in trading losses.”127  Nonetheless, 
these charges only address the outward trappings of JPMorgan’s outsized 
risk-taking, rather than the risk-taking itself.  That risk-taking, which 
evinced a failure of indirect other-regarding behavior, remains 
unpunishable by criminal sanctions—it could only have been addressed by 
the OCC taking steps to enforce its prudential regulations against 
JPMorgan. 
Unfortunately, the OCC’s performance left much to be desired in this 
instance: “[t]he increase in the [CIO derivatives portfolio’s] size and risk 
triggered a breach of the CIO’s and bankwide [sic] VaR limits, which the 
bank disclosed to the OCC in routine risk reports at the time, but which did 
not trigger an agency inquiry.”128  It seems that it was easier for the OCC to 
simply acquiesce in JPMorgan’s conduct,129 rather than taking more 
aggressive actions that would have been unpopular with JPMorgan in the 
short-term but upheld the regulators’ obligation to preserve financial 
stability for others.130 The OCC’s conduct in this situation suggests that 
 
 124.   Senate Report, supra note 111, at 8-9 (“[T]he bank was not forthcoming and even 
provided incorrect information” about the CIO’s derivatives portfolio.). Id. at 14 (“In a 
quarterly meeting in late January 2012, the bank told the OCC that it planned to reduce the 
size of the SCP, but then increased the portfolio and its attendant risks.”). 
 125.  Press Release, U.S. Attorney for the S. Dist. of N.Y., Attorney Gen., Manhattan 
U.S. Attorney, and FBI Assistant Director-In-Charge Announce Charges Against Two 
Derivatives Traders In Connection With Multi-Billion Dollar Trading Loss At JPMorgan 
Chase & Company (Aug. 14, 2013). 
 126.  Press Release No. 2013-154, Sec. Exch. Comm’n., SEC Charges Two J.P. Morgan 
Traders with Fraudulently Overvaluing Investments to Conceal Losses (Aug. 14, 2013). 
 127.  Press Release No. 2013-187, Sec. Exch. Comm’n., JPMorgan Chase Agrees to Pay 
$200 Million and Admits Wrongdoing to Settle SEC Charges (Sept. 19, 2013). 
 128.  Senate Report, supra note 111, at 9. 
 129.  When the OCC tried to investigate JPMorgan’s conduct in the past, they were 
criticized by JPMorgan as “being overly intrusive”. Id. at 14. 
 130.  Id. at 10 (“JPMorgan Chase’s ability to dodge effective OCC oversight . . . 
demonstrates that bank regulators need to conduct more aggressive oversight with their 
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regulatory failings, in addition to industry failings, persist post-Financial 
Crisis. 
II. ADDRESSING FINANCIAL INDUSTRY CULTURE 
The previous section illustrated that financial instability is a product of 
both cognitive failures and failures of indirect other-regarding behavior.  A 
large post-Crisis scholarship has already examined the relevant cognitive 
failures in depth: this Section focuses instead on ways of changing the 
norms that characterize financial industry culture,131 in order to promote 
more other-regarding behavior. 
To date, much of the legal scholarship on norms has followed the law 
and economics paradigm.  For example, McAdams’ much-cited esteem 
theory of norms relies on a rationally self-interested calculus by an actor 
about how he or she is perceived.  Self-interest is viewed as encompassing 
reputational utility as well as material interests, and McAdams posits that 
“the initial force behind norm creation is the desire individuals have for 
respect or prestige, that is, for the relative esteem of others.”132  The law 
and economics literature thus focuses on using “reputation, expressive 
effects, shaming and social sanctioning”133 to create norms and change 
behavior.134 
Unfortunately, the prescriptions of law and economics hold little 
promise for affecting a broad shift in the financial industry’s norms with 
respect to destabilizing activities.  For example, while unrestrained 
leverage and financial innovation can prove to be destabilizing, judicious 
 
existing tools and develop more effective tools to detect and stop unsafe and unsound 
derivatives trading.”).  
 131.  William C. Dudley, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Enhancing Financial 
Stability by Improving Culture in the Financial Services Industry: Remarks at the Workshop 
on Reforming Culture and Behavior in the Financial Services Industry, (Oct. 20, 2014) 
(“Culture [within a financial institution] relates to the implicit norms that guide behavior in 
the absence of regulations or compliance rules—and sometimes despite those explicit 
restraints.  Culture exists within every firm whether it is recognized or ignored, whether it is 
nurtured or neglected, and whether it is embraced of disavowed.  Culture reflects the 
prevailing attitudes and behaviors within a firm.  It is how people react not only to black and 
white, but to all of the shades of grey.  Like a gentle breeze, culture may be hard to see, but 
you can feel it.  Culture relates to what ‘should’ I do, and not to what ‘can’ I do.”). 
 132.  Richard H. McAdams, Origin, Development and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. 
REV. 338, 342 (1997) (emphasis added). 
 133.  Yuval Feldman, Behavioral Ethics Meets Behavioral Law and Economics, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND LAW 213, 225 (2014). 
 134.  McAdams, supra note 132, at 355 (“If many people agree that a behavior deserves 
disapproval, if there is an inherent risk the behavior will be detected, and if this agreement 
and risk are well-known, then the pattern of disapproval itself creates cost to the behavior.  
When sufficiently large, these cost produce a norm against the behavior.”). 
ARTICLE 4 (ALLEN).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/16/15  11:49 AM 
2015] THE PATHOLOGIES OF BANKING BUSINESS AS USUAL 889 
 
amounts of these activities are necessary to the proper functioning of the 
financial system.135 Consequently, it is very difficult to delineate ex ante the 
levels of such activities that we want to permit, and those we do not.  
Without clear rules about what is and is not acceptable, problematic 
behavior “cannot be articulated, publicized, and detected with the clarity 
and consistency that is necessary to marshal the public to shun 
offenders”.136 Dombalagian makes a similar point in the context of the 
Volcker Rule (a provision of Dodd-Frank which limits—but recognizes 
some beneficial aspects of—proprietary trading by banking entities): “both 
the Rule itself and the rules promulgated thereunder attest to the difficulty 
of defining the kind of conduct promoted, tolerated or discouraged under 
the putative norm.”137 In the absence of clarity, public shaming cannot be 
harnessed to create industry-wide norms regarding destabilizing activities. 
Within a financial institution that was truly committed to indirect 
other-regarding behavior, there would be more scope for the forging of 
norms through reputational utility.  An institution can be more prescriptive 
about the types of activities that are and are not permitted within that 
institution, and an employee who deviates from these rules for the purpose 
of making short-term gains might run the risk of opprobrium and blame 
from his peers within the firm138 (as well as the risk of being disciplined or 
fired).  Financial activities, however, are constantly evolving, and internal 
firm activities restrictions might not always be able to be as prescriptive as 
we might like.  More importantly, large financial institutions currently tend 
to herd together in performing destabilizing but immediately profitable 
activities,139 and an individual financial institution that forgoes profit in 
order to improve stability without the protection of the herd risks 
punishment from its shareholders.140  What is most needed, then, is an 
industry-wide norm of indirect other-regarding behavior, rather than 
activity- and institution-specific norms.141  The aim of this Section is to 
 
 135.  See supra text accompanying notes 42-43. 
 136.  Dombalagian, supra note 12, at 499.   
 137.  Id. at 500. 
 138.  Sunstein, supra note 27, at 945 (“[Experimental work] shows that agents are 
willing to cooperate, and hence to solve collective action problems without coercion, if most 
people are seen as cooperators; in such circumstances the social meaning of noncooperation 
is greed or selfishness.”). 
 139.  Brett McDonnell, Don’t Panic! Defending Cowardly Interventions During and 
After a Crisis, 116 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1, 13 (2011) (“Should the strategy fail, everyone will 
be in the same boat and individual managers will get little blame.”). 
 140.  William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder 
Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 720-721 (2010). 
 141.  Claire Hill & Richard Painter, Berle’s Vision Beyond Shareholder Interests: Why 
Investment Bankers Should Have (Some) Personal Liability, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1173, 
1197 (2010) (arguing that the financial industry needs to make “excessive risk takers . . . 
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explore ways of reorienting the governing norms of the financial industry 
as a whole in ways that do not rely on censure and shaming from the 
general public. 
New bodies of research have emerged that critique the law and 
economics scholarship and recognize that rational self-interest is not the 
only motivator of behavior.142 This research demonstrates that internal 
motivators, as well as social context, are important drivers of behavior, and 
that shaming is not the only way to motivate cultural change.  As such, 
educational and institutional reforms can improve financial stability if they 
succeed in causing financial industry participants to internalize norms of 
indirect other-regarding behavior,143 so that such norms “come to mind in 
decision-making because they are part of [a financial industry employee’s] 
identity, [and] they thus contend with, and even suppress, other 
motivations, such as the self-interest that may characterize his or her 
business identity and that of the business group.”144 
One such body of literature that contradicts the law and economics 
approach is known as behavioral ethics.145  Developed primarily by 
management scholars, behavioral ethics is concerned with two different 
levels of cognitive processing:146 System 1 relates to intuitive processes, 
whereas System 2 is characterized by conscious thought and reasoning.147  
Behavioral ethicists conclude that while we may often automatically and 
unconsciously act in our own self-interest (as a result of the intuitive 
processes of System 1),148 we are also motivated by an innate desire to view 
ourselves as moral creatures.149  As such, if norms of indirect other-
regarding behavior are internalized and kept salient, deliberative System 2 
cognition can override the self-interest sought by System 1.150  (It is even 
 
stand out from the herd instead of leading everyone else over the precipice.”). 
 142.  Feldman, supra note 133, at 15-16 (“[S]ocial norms change behavior mostly by 
subconscious effects that are not associated with the costs and benefits of following social 
norms.”). 
 143.  Fanto, supra note 34, at 45. 
 144.  Id. at 42-43. 
 145.  Feldman, supra note 133, at 15-16 (arguing that behavioral ethics takes the view 
that self-interest is a subconscious motivator, whereas law and economics expects a more 
rational and conscious calculation of costs and benefits in determining what constitutes self-
interest). 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  On Amir & Orly Lobel, Stumble, Predict, Nudge: How Behavioral Economics 
Informs Law and Policy, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2098, 2110 (2008). 
 148.  Feldman, supra note 133, at 4. 
 149.  Nina Mazar, On Amir & Dan Arierly, The Dishonesty of Honest People: A Theory 
of Self-Concept Maintenance, 45 J. MKTG. RES. 633, 634 (2008) (“[I]t has been shown that 
people typically . . . have strong beliefs in their own morality, and that they want to maintain 
this aspect of their self-concept.”). 
 150.  Fanto, supra note 34, at 34. 
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possible that norms of other-regarding behavior may become part of 
System 1’s instinctual response.  Some research indicates that in social 
contexts, being seen as cooperative and esteemed by one’s peers is in one’s 
self interest, and so cooperating with accepted norms becomes 
automatic).151  While the behavioral ethics literature expresses a concern 
that System 2 might sometimes be deployed after the fact to rationalize and 
justify automatic self-interested behavior, rather than preventing it in the 
first place,152 even this would be an improvement over the financial 
industry’s status quo.  At present, there is no need for industry personnel to 
even rationalize their self-interested actions, and thus their activities are not 
impeded by any cognitive dissonance whatsoever. 
An alternative challenge to traditional law and economics is posed by 
the prosocial literature, which finds that that while self-interest is certainly 
a relevant motivator, innate other-regarding norms also inform our 
behavior so long as incentives and cultural factors are not stacked too 
heavily against such norms.153  Summarizing the empirical findings 
regarding when prosocial behavior is more (and less) likely, Stout has 
developed the following model for creating the optimal conditions for 
people to act in the interests of others, simply because it is the right thing to 
do: 
Unselfish prosocial behavior toward strangers, including 
unselfish compliance with legal and ethical rules, is triggered by 
social context, including especially: 
instructions from authority; 
beliefs about others’ 
prosocial behavior; and 
the magnitude of benefits to 
others. 
Prosocial behavior declines, however, as the personal cost 
of acting prosocially increases.154 
 
This section’s discussion of educational and industry reforms will be 
primarily informed by Stout’s model. 
To be clear, even once internalized, other-regarding norms provide no 
precise prescription for how financial industry personnel should act.155  
 
 151.  Feldman, supra note 133, at 8. 
 152.  The concern is that people “do harm when it serves their self-interest and at the 
same time feel good about it”.  Id. at 19. 
 153.   See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text. 
 154.  STOUT, supra note 11, at 99 (emphasis in original). 
 155.  This is inevitable, given that something as complex as financial stability does not 
lend itself to “ascertainably correct solutions.”  Bandes, supra note 21 at 220. 
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Different people might have different conceptions of what is in others’ best 
interests, and some might think that financial stability should be 
subservient to other public interests.156  For example, arguments have been 
made that the MBS bubble was actually caused by other-regarding 
behavior, in the sense that it was inspired by the Community Reinvestment 
Act and other policies aimed at making home ownership more accessible—
at the expense of financial stability.157  In fact, the evidence is reasonably 
clear that these arguments are incorrect and that affordable housing policies 
were not responsible for causing the Financial Crisis.158  Nonetheless, if the 
promotion of home ownership had been the true animus of the financial 
industry in the lead-up to the Financial Crisis, this Article would not be in a 
position to say that the industry had demonstrated any failure of indirect 
other-regarding behavior in connection with the MBS bubble: this Article 
does not purport to say how people should evaluate others’ best interests, 
only that they should evaluate others’ best interests. 
This does not mean, however, that exhortations towards indirect other-
regarding behavior are completely indeterminate or lacking in content.  
One clear guideline is that it is unacceptable for financial industry 
personnel to focus entirely on their short-term self-interest, or on the short-
term self-interest of the institution that employs them.  Another clear 
guideline is that financial industry personnel should start from the 
presumption that there is societal benefit to complying with regulation and 
cooperating with regulators, instead of automatically adopting a zero-sum 
stance and assuming that all regulation should be arbitraged.159  The final 
 
 156.  Saule T. Omarova, Bankers, Bureaucrats and Guardians: Towards Tripartism in 
Financial Services Regulation, 37 J. CORP. L. 621, 669 (2012); Bandes, supra note 21, at 
227. 
 157.  Peter J. Wallison, Dissenting Statement, FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N (2011), 
http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_final_report_wallison_ 
dissent.pdf; Phil Gramm & Mike Solon, The Clinton-Era Roots of the Financial Crisis, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 2013, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732347760457 
9000571334113350.  
 158.  For a methodical debunking of Wallison’s arguments, see DAVID MIN, CTR. FOR 
AM. PROGRESS, WHY WALLISON IS WRONG ABOUT THE GENESIS OF THE U.S. HOUSING 
CRISIS: RESPONDING TO WALLISON’S LATEST DEFENSE OF HIS FLAWED FINANCIAL CRISIS 
INQUIRY COMMISSION DISSENT, (2011), http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/issues/2011/07/pdf/ min_wallison.pdf. 
 159.  William C. Dudley, President and C.E.O., Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Ending Too 
Big To Fail, Remarks at the Global Economic Policy Forum (Nov. 7, 2013) (noting that 
regulatory reform alone “may not solve another important problem evident within some 
large financial institutions—the apparent lack of respect for law, regulation and the public 
trust.”); Fanto, supra note 34, at 5 (noting that “a compliance approach that changes the 
perspective of firm employees so that they consider policies behind the rules, which include 
the long-term stability of the financial system and customer confidence in the markets, 
would help employees understand the potential dangers of certain financial products and 
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clear guideline is that, given the gravity of the social consequences of 
financial instability, the promotion of financial stability should always at 
least figure in the other-regarding behavior calculus for financial industry 
personnel (even if it is ultimately decided that there is some more deserving 
goal that trumps financial stability). 
Within this framework, financial industry personnel may come to 
different conclusions about how best to minimize the destabilizing 
externalities of their activities,160 and about whether and when financial 
stability should be subservient to other goals.  Differing opinions on these 
issues are not necessarily a bad thing: Professors Romano and Whitehead 
have written at length about how regulation that correlates behavior can 
prove destabilizing,161 and encouraging industry personnel to make their 
own other-regarding judgments might mitigate this destabilizing 
correlation.  In some circumstances, though, financial industry personnel 
may turn out to be just plain wrong in their assessments and their cognitive 
errors, despite the best other-regarding intentions, may end up destabilizing 
the financial system.162  This possibility of error does not mean, however, 
that attempts to engender more indirect other-regarding behavior in the 
financial industry are pointless.  Holding the potential for cognitive errors 
equal, it stands to reason that destabilizing behavior will be less likely in 
circumstances where externalities are considered than in circumstances 
where they are not.  And this is likely understating the case for indirect 
other-regarding behavior: too intense a focus on short-term self-interest is 
likely to limit a cognitive assessment of the risks involved in a given 
activity,163 and so the potential for cognitive errors is likely higher in the 
absence of other-regarding behavior. 
It is, of course, a monumental task to change an industry’s culture to 
render it more other-regarding, and the reforms suggested in this Article are 
only first steps in trying to achieve this goal.  The silver lining, however, is 
that for many people, the norms of short-term self-interest that guide the 
financial industry are adopted later in life, in graduate education or on the 
 
services” (emphasis added)). 
 160.  Allen, New Philosophy, supra note 42, at 203 (“the complexity of the financial 
system . . . is such that precise answers cannot be achieved”). 
 161.  Roberta Romano, For Diversity in the International Regulation of Financial 
Institutions: Critiquing and Recalibrating the Basel Architecture, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 1 
(2014); Charles K. Whitehead, Destructive Coordination, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 323 (2011). 
 162.  It is impossible to perfectly calibrate activities in a way that both allows for growth, 
and ensures that no risks are taken that would imperil the stability of the financial system. 
Brett H. McDonnell, Of Mises and Min(sky): Libertarian and Liberal Responses to 
Financial Crises Past and Present, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1279, 1310 (2011).  
 163.  See supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing incentive bias and 
underappreciated risk). 
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job, and are generally compartmentalized to that education or job.164  While 
some individuals are by nature more self-interested than others,165 if 
financial industry culture as a whole is made more other-regarding, then 
that could lessen the attraction for those individuals to join the financial 
industry.166  To the extent that norms of short-term self-interest are learned, 
they can be unlearned,167 notwithstanding how deeply ingrained they are 
currently in financial institution culture.  There is no single policy solution 
that can revolutionize financial industry culture in this way: such an 
endeavor requires a multi-pronged approach that confronts different aspects 
of business education and financial institution operations.  The remainder 
of this Section will therefore explore a variety of proposals for 
complementary reforms. 
A. Business School Reform 
Since the 1960s, when neoclassical economics became the touchstone 
of business education,168 morality and values have been largely excluded 
from the core business school curriculum.169 Although many business 
schools offer ethics and behavioral economics courses that challenge the 
position that we are all rational self-interested actors, traditional 
neoclassical economic modeling continues to hold sway in core business 
classes.  These core classes thus tend to dismiss consideration of values, 
which are “hard to define, hard to measure, and seemingly at odds with the 
calculating rationality that was the starting point for traditional economic 
modeling.”170  Given this context, it is perhaps not surprising that research 
 
 164.  Richard Painter, The Moral Responsibilities of Investment Bankers, 8 U. ST. 
THOMAS L.J. 5, 18-19 (2010). 
 165.  This Article does not tackle the issue of whether the financial industry tends to 
attract employees who are somehow less moral than the average person. It focuses instead 
on how financial industry culture causes individuals to put aside the other-regarding 
inclinations that they do have.   
 166.  Dudley, supra note 131 (“[T]he degree to which an industry attracts risk-takers is 
not pre-ordained, but reflects the prevailing incentives in the industry.  After all, risk-takers 
have options.”). 
 167.  Moral norms that guide behavior can be learned and unlearned.  George A. Akerlof 
& Rachel E. Kranton, Identity and the Economics of Organizations, 19 J. ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES 9, 12 (2005). 
 168.  JUSTIN FOX, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL MARKET: A HISTORY OF RISK, REWARD, 
AND DELUSION ON WALL STREET 103 (2011). 
 169.  Herbert Gintis & Rakesh Khurana, Corporate Honesty and Business Education: A 
Behavioral Model, in MORAL MARKETS: THE CRITICAL ROLE OF VALUES IN THE ECONOMY 
300 (Paul J. Zak ed., 2008). 
 170.  Oliver R. Goodenough, Values, Mechanism Design and Fairness, in MORAL 
MARKETS: THE CRITICAL ROLE OF VALUES IN THE ECONOMY 228, 228 (Paul J. Zak ed., 
2008); see also Long Wang, Deepak Malhotra & J. Keith Murnighan, Economics Education 
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indicates that those with economic and financial training tend to be more 
selfish and less other-regarding than other members of society.171 If, 
however, business education is responsible for repressing natural 
inclinations towards other-regarding behavior, then we have a very good 
idea about where to start fixing financial industry culture (and even when 
incoming students already show a strong propensity towards self-interest, 
business school education can help mitigate this).172 
To these ends, a number of scholars have called for an overhaul of 
business education that stresses the importance of trust, honesty, decency, 
accountability, fairness and the common good, rather than having business 
schools teach that compensation is the only important motivator.173  This is 
intended to return business education to its pre-1960s roots as informed by 
“a rhetoric of social duty that framed business education as having a higher 
aim than mere ‘moneymaking.’”174  As part of such an overhaul, ethics 
should be integrated into core business school classes so that students are 
given some guidance as to how to make other-regarding choices in context, 
rather than ethics being relegated to stand-alone courses that are often 
dismissed as a waste of time.175  Some sense of history of financial booms 
and busts (and the contribution that the financial industry has made thereto) 
should also be incorporated into core business school courses: people are 
more likely to engage in other-regarding behaviors if the magnitude of 
perceived benefits to others is large,176 so it is important that business 
school students learn about how the financial industry can exacerbate the 
ups and downs of the business cycle (particularly through its use of 
 
and Greed, 10 ACAD. MGMT. LEARNING EDUC. 643, 643-47 (2011) (commenting on how 
economics training assumes self-interest maximization and de-emphasizes social 
consequences). 
 171.  For a discussion of this research, see Stout, MORAL MARKETS, supra note 26, at 
168-70; see also Jackson, supra note 77, at 750-52. Of course, this finding may be partially 
explained by self-selection: more selfish individuals may be drawn to business school.  To 
that end, Thomas J. Peters’ proposal that elite business schools “apply a simple admissions 
rule: anyone from an ultra-privileged background needs to have done something of 
significant social value to be admitted,” may assist.  Jodi Kantor, Class Is Seen Dividing 
Harvard Business School, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/10/ 
education/harvard-business-students-see-class-as-divisive-an-issue-as-gender.html. 
 172.  Robert A. Giacalone & Mark D. Promislo, Broken When Entering: The 
Stigmatization of Goodness and Business Ethics Education, 12 ACAD. MGMT. LEARNING 
EDUC. 86, 95-96 (2013). 
 173.  Gintis & Khurana, supra note 169, at 300-01; Jackson, supra note 77, at 758; 
Zingales, infra note 264. 
 174.  RAKESH KHURANA, FROM HIGHER AIMS TO HIRED HANDS: THE SOCIAL 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN BUSINESS SCHOOLS AND THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF 
MANAGEMENT AS A PROFESSION 91 (2007). 
 175.  Zingales, infra note 264. 
 176.  STOUT, supra note 11, at 99. 
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leverage), and the human cost of financial instability.177  In the absence of 
such instruction, students may assume that the business cycle is entirely 
independent of their actions,178 and thus that prosocial behavior is 
irrelevant.  Furthermore, if financial stability is framed as the desired status 
quo rather than as a transitional phase of the business cycle, deviations 
from financial stability are more likely to be viewed as a loss to be 
avoided.179 
Given that prosocial behavior is often triggered by instructions from 
authority,180 it is key that the ethics and history components of the business 
school curriculum are taught by business school deans and prominent 
faculty members.181  Other-regarding behaviors could also be encouraged 
by offering some type of clinic in business schools, where students provide 
less-privileged members of society with services like financial counseling 
or retirement planning.  Once students graduate and start working in the 
financial industry, it has been observed that “[a] strong in-group versus out-
group cultural orientation [often exists which encourages] the maintenance 
of a highly aggressive, opportunistic stance toward outsiders”:182 distance 
between those in the financial industry and those ultimately impacted by 
the industry’s decisions makes it difficult to establish an other-regarding, 
stability-minded culture.183  By creating relationships during business 
 
 177.  McDonnell, supra note 139, at 27 (“As memories of bad times dim, banks and 
businesses become willing to take on more risk.”); see also FOX, supra note 168, at 319.  
Historical material would have the added benefit of familiarizing students with the mistakes 
that caused those past crises, hopefully making it less likely that those mistakes will be 
repeated. 
 178.  HO, supra note 25, at 11 (“[T]he construction of booms and busts are simply 
conflated with ‘the market’ and are not understood as arising from the particular workplace 
models, corporate culture, and organizational values of Wall Street financial institutions 
(investment banks in particular) or the specific and personal experiences of those who work 
for them.”). 
 179.  Compelling research has found that people prefer avoiding losses to making gains.  
As such, framing a problem as a loss can have a significant impact on how people respond 
to that problem.  Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics, 28 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 531, 535 
(2005). 
 180.  STOUT, supra note 11, at 99. 
 181.   Gintis & Khurana, supra note 169, at 324 (“[B]usiness school faculties and deans 
have an institutional responsibility to socialize students to a model of behavior that inspires 
them to respect other institutions in society, especially the basic units of family and 
community, and to inspire students to accept the responsibilities and obligations that come 
with occupying society’s most powerful positions.”). 
 182.  Langevoort, supra note 17, at 1216. 
 183.  STOUT, supra note 11 at 101.  The increasing specialization of, and lengths of 
chains of intermediation within, the financial industry have led to ever-greater attenuation 
between the decisions made by individual industry employees and those impacted by their 
decisions. Awrey et al., supra note 10, at 14 (“[T]he anonymity within large, complex 
organizations; technologies enabling ‘faceless’ communication across great distances, and 
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school between students and those outside of the financial sector, a 
business school clinic program (which could be complemented by an 
ongoing pro bono requirement for the financial industry) could be effective 
in ensuring that financial industry personnel see people who are impacted 
by their decisions, but do not themselves have control over the levers of 
financial stability.  Consequently, students would view these individuals as 
sufficiently connected to them to be worthy of their consideration.184  Not 
only would these programs put a face on the “other” the financial industry 
should be regarding, they also have the potential to change the financial 
industry’s perspective on money.  Realizing that a few hundred dollars can 
mean a world of difference to some people might shatter the blasé 
indifference that can come from constantly seeing strings of zeroes flash 
across a computer screen with little perceptible consequence.185 
B. Corporate Governance Reform 
It is clear that it will take time for any changes made in business 
education to percolate into the financial industry.186  Because of the 
importance of instructions from authority in establishing what is and is not 
acceptable behavior,187 there is a very real concern that more seasoned 
industry veterans, weaned on a philosophy of pure self-interest, will “haze” 
any other-regarding behavior inculcated in business schools out of new 
financial industry employees.  To that end, reforming business education 
will not work on its own; it must be coupled with efforts to change industry 
culture from within. 
To date, most attempts to reform risk-taking in financial institutions 
have focused on compensation incentive structures.  There are many papers 
that have already explored how banker pay incentivizes short-termism and 
a “heads we win, tails you lose” attitude amongst bank employees.188 This 
 
the commoditization of business transactions and relationships might all be expected to 
decrease moral intensity.”). 
 184.  Research suggests that violations of the norm of other-regarding can to some extent 
be excused when the “other” is perceived to be outside of the actor’s in-group.  Stout, 
MORAL MARKETS, supra note 26, at 162; Zak, supra note 21, at 262. 
 185.  This would encourage a better appreciation of the magnitude of the benefit of 
financial stability, as per part (iii) of Stout’s model.  STOUT, supra note 11, at 99. 
 186.  See Gintis & Khurana, supra note 169, at 302 (describing the anti-corruption 
socialization campaigns in Hong Kong schools as an example of the delayed impact of 
education campaigns on social norms). 
 187.  STOUT, supra note 11, at 99. 
 188.  The most prominent of these papers being Bebchuk & Spamann, infra note 325.  
For a focus on the compensation of traders, rather than executives, see Simone M. Sepe & 
Charles K. Whitehead, Paying for Risk: Bankers, Compensation, and Competition (Cornell 
Law Faculty Working Papers, Paper No. 114, 2014). 
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Article will not retread that ground.  Instead, this Article draws attention to 
how difficult it is to fine-tune the alignment of incentives with desired risk 
taking; the multiplicity of differing proposals for compensation reform 
attests to this idea.189  This Article also notes that these complex proposals 
invite arbitrage, which could have unintended and unforeseen destabilizing 
consequences.  Thus, while this Article recognizes the value of attempts to 
better align compensation incentives with society’s interest in financial 
stability, it stresses the importance of exploring broader cultural reform 
proposals as well.190 
Importantly, desired outcomes can sometimes be achieved without the 
micro-manipulation of incentives; people often obey internalized moral 
norms without material incentives to do so because they want to maintain a 
positive conception of themselves as moral human beings.191  Short notes 
that “[n]ormatively motivated decisions are often characterized precisely 
by their disregard of the material costs and benefits of the action.”192  As 
such, if people within the financial industry were to see themselves as 
having a social responsibility to avoid financial instability, they would be 
more willing to forgo short-term financial gain in order to maintain their 
 
 189.  See, e.g., Bebchuk & Spamann infra note 325, at 253; FINANCIAL STABILITY 
FORUM, FSF PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND COMPENSATION PRACTICES 2 (2009); Sanjai Bhagat & 
Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing and Committing to the 
Long Term, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 359 (2009); U.K. PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE ON BANKING 
STANDARDS, infra note 280, at 8-9; Sepe & Whitehead, supra note 188.  Bruner notes that 
“the combined thinking [on how to structure compensation to balance risk and financial 
rewards] of seven financial regulators, comprising fifty pages of the Federal Register, 
amounts to little more than a directive to reduce risk-taking. How, exactly, is that to be 
done? ‘We don’t know,’ our regulators implicitly reply. ‘You figure it out.’” Christopher M. 
Bruner, Concepts of Corporate Purpose in Post-Crisis Financial Firms, 36 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 527, 558 (2013). 
 190.  It is also worth considering whether hard caps on financial industry compensation 
should be implemented, given that “the increasing presence of money and wealth in the 
immediate surroundings tends to prompt more selfishness.” Langevoort, supra note 17, at 
1240.  In a related vein, Sepe & Whitehead make several proposals aimed at taming market 
pressures to reward traders with extremely high salaries.  Sepe & Whitehead, supra note 
188.  Although the EU’s decision to cap bank bonuses has been criticized by the Squam 
Lake Group for failing to properly address bankers’ risk-taking incentives, the cap may 
nonetheless be valuable if it allows room for norms of other-regarding behavior to flourish. 
Martin N. Baily et al., Aligning Incentives at Systemically Important Financial Institutions 
(Columbia Bus. Sch Working Paper No. 13-18, 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2239895 (critizing EU’s decision to cap bank bonuses).  A 
reduction in compensation could also discourage naturally self-interested people from 
gravitating to the financial industry in the first place.  
 191.  “[T]o maintain their positive self-concepts, people will comply with their internal 
standards even when doing so involves investments of effort or sacrificing financial gains.” 
Mazar et al., supra note 149, at 633. 
 192.  Short, supra note 23, at 505. 
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self-concept as a steward for the financial system (and regulations and 
regulators would have less work to do).193  Incidentally, such a shift toward 
other-regarding behavior and sense of societal purpose might also increase 
job satisfaction in the industry.194  This section will therefore explore 
reforms that can assist in creating an environment in which such other-
regarding behavior can flourish. 
1. Board Reforms 
At present, the boards of financial institutions are primarily concerned 
with the interests of their shareholders.195 Financial stability, however, 
would be best served by authorizing such boards to consider the interests of 
non-shareholder stakeholders.196  While prioritizing the interests of such 
stakeholders would certainly be a departure from the prevailing theories of 
corporate governance,197 special governance rules for financial institutions 
 
 193.  ZAK, supra note 21, at 264; STOUT, supra note 11, at 212; Fanto, supra note 34, at 
28. 
 194.  Disaffectedness and cognitive dissonance can arise when natural inclinations 
towards other-regarding behavior are shut out of the workplace: “Researchers have . . . 
found a connection between self-reported happiness and ethical behavior.” STOUT, supra 
note 11, at 241.  Unfortunately, the current ethos of the financial industry might be 
summarized as “a “lose-lose” proposition, either wealth and irresponsibility or integrity and 
failure.”  Solomon, supra note 24, at 36.  An op-ed written by former Goldman Sachs 
employee Greg Smith has come to epitomize the disaffectedness that many financial 
industry employees feel:  
culture was always a vital part of Goldman Sachs’s success. It revolved around 
teamwork, integrity, a spirit of humility, and always doing right by our clients. 
The culture was the secret sauce that made this place great and allowed us to 
earn our clients’ trust for 143 years. It wasn’t just about making money; this 
alone will not sustain a firm for so long. It had something to do with pride and 
belief in the organization. I am sad to say that I look around today and see 
virtually no trace of the culture that made me love working for this firm for 
many years. I no longer have the pride, or the belief. . . . I truly believe that this 
decline in the firm’s moral fiber represents the single most serious threat to its 
long-run survival. . . . I don’t know of any illegal behavior, but will people push 
the envelope and pitch lucrative and complicated products to clients even if they 
are not the simplest investments or the ones most directly aligned with the 
client’s goals? Absolutely. Every day, in fact.  
Greg Smith, Why I Am Leaving Goldman Sachs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2012, at A27. 
 195.  ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES: WHAT’S 
WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 126 (2013). 
 196.  Financial institution shareholders often push those institutions to generate profits 
from high-risk activities that can prove destabilizing. Bruner, supra note 189, at 552-53, 
557-559.   
 197.  The prevailing theory of corporate governance is that “public corporations ‘belong’ 
to their shareholders, and they exist for one purpose only, to maximize shareholders’ wealth.  
Shareholder wealth, in turn, is typically measured by share price—meaning share price 
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are not entirely unprecedented: a number of courts have opined that bank 
directors owe duties to a broader range of constituents than do directors of 
non-bank corporations.198  In any event, a systemic failure will impact 
diversified shareholders more than the profitability of any one institution,199 
so financial stability is actually in the best interests of most financial 
institution shareholders.  As such, financial institution boards can 
justifiably prioritize financial stability, even though doing so could 
detrimentally impact the institution’s share price. 
There are therefore strong justifications for allowing the boards and 
managers of financial institutions to consider issues of financial stability in 
their deliberations.  Awrey, Blair and Kershaw have proposed a “Take 
Externalities Seriously” initiative, which would require financial 
institutions to implement controls and processes: 
 
(1) to ensure that the identification and avoidance of socially 
excessive risk taking is embedded in corporate culture; (2) to 
identify and monitor potential socially excessive (i.e. systemic) 
risks generated by a firm’s activities; (3) to better understand a 
firm’s exposure to systemic risk; and (4) to determine how best to 
minimize these risks on an ongoing basis.200 
 
In particular, Awrey et al. propose that financial institutions should be 
required to have a senior ethics committee on the board of directors that 
would oversee monitoring and reporting of socially-excessive risk-
 
today.”  LYNN A. STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS 
FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS AND THE PUBLIC 2-3 (2012).  However, the 
assumption that corporations are legally required to maximize shareholder value is in many 
respects an ideological position that is susceptible to challenge.  Id. at 3-4.  
 198.  Robert T. Miller, Oversight Liability for Risk-Management Failures at Financial 
Firms, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 47 (2010-11). 
 199.  John Armour & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systemic Harms and Shareholder Value, 6 J. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 35, 40-41 (2013). 
 200.  Awrey et al., supra note 10, at 33.  To be clear, while corporate governance 
initiatives are intended to encourage better behavior from within the industry, they will not 
take root or succeed without some external regulation backing them up.  Regulators would 
therefore need to require financial institutions to implement the necessary board committees 
and compliance mechanisms, and should judge fulfillment of such requirements by the level 
of the financial institution’s commitment to raising awareness of, and establishing norms 
that seek to avoid, the negative externalities of financial institution activities.  Awrey et al., 
supra note 10, at 33.  In addition, the SEC’s Regulation S-K could be amended to require 
financial institutions that are listed in the United States to publicly disclose the steps they 
are taking to improve financial stability by reducing externalities.  This would require 
financial institutions to develop clear compliance plans, and the public dissemination of 
such plans could build up to the creation of best practices for institutions to follow. 
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taking.201  Such an initiative could, for example, empower boards to 
prioritize lower leverage and longer-term funding options for the 
institution’s trading operations, notwithstanding that these may generate 
less profit for shareholders in the short-term.  Similarly, it could support 
policies to abandon the development of complex new products that 
demonstrate limited social utility, even though the products might generate 
large fees for the institution in the short-term (or at least implement policies 
that require that a single individual retain day-to-day responsibility for the 
entire life-cycle of the new financial product).202 
If, as per Awrey et al.’s proposal, consideration of externalities is 
going to fall heavily on financial institution boards, it is worth giving some 
thought to the composition of those boards—particularly the boards of the 
large, systemically important financial institutions (“SIFIs”) that have the 
greatest potential to destabilize the financial system.203  Dodd-Frank 
already requires that the boards of SIFIs establish risk committees with 
specified levels of independence and expertise,204 but this Article will 
explore more radical changes.  One policy that might institutionalize other-
regarding voices on SIFI boards would be to require such institutions to 
dedicate a critical mass of board seats to publicly-elected or 
administratively-appointed figures representing the public’s interest in 
financial stability.205  Such public directors could “restrain[] self-interest 
run amok in the corporate inner circles . . . [as well as] counter the natural 
inclination of those at the summit of the corporate hierarchy to form self-
 
 201.  Awrey et al., supra note 10, at 34. 
 202.  Research suggests that immoral behavior is encouraged by “break[ing] up 
decisions into parts so most individuals were only responsible for moving the decision 
forward and could not claim ultimate responsibility for an action.” ZAK, supra note 21, at 
261; see also Amir & Lobel, supra note 147, at 2134-35.  This type of thinking informs the 
recommendation of the U.K. Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, which 
recommends that a new “Senior Persons Regime” be implemented so that “key 
responsibilities within banks are assigned to specific individuals, who are made fully and 
unambiguously aware of those responsibilities and made to understand that they will be held 
to account for how they carry them out.” U.K. PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE ON BANKING 
STANDARDS, infra note 280, at 8-9.  
 203.  This Article focuses on larger, systemically significant firms, rather than on 
smaller, local institutions providing traditional retail banking products and services, because 
the former are far more likely to endanger systemic stability. Omarova, supra note 47, at 
456-57. 
 204.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act § 165(h), 12 U.S.C. § 
5346 (2010). 
 205.  In the broader corporate context, Fanto has explored at length the rationale for, and 
the logistics of, requiring corporations to have a critical mass of public directors on their 
boards.  See James Fanto, Whistleblowing and the Public Director: Countering Corporate 
Inner Circles, 83 OR. L. REV. 435, 490-540 (2004)(discussing the importance of corporate 
boards comprising a critical mass of public directors).  
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contained groups that are characterized by groupthink and other negative 
group dynamics.”206  In many respects, this type of proposal mimics 
McDonnell and Schwarcz’s proposal that “regulatory contrarians” be 
embedded in financial regulatory agencies207— these “board contrarians” 
would be an other-regarding voice forcing the rest of the board members to 
“interact during the decision-making process with [people] with differing 
backgrounds and biases, and . . . publicly defend their positions.”208  As 
noted above, courts have already recognized that bank directors can 
represent interests beyond those of their shareholders,209 and legislation like 
Dodd-Frank already authorizes enhanced supervisory and prudential 
standards for SIFIs.210  A requirement that the public interest be represented 
on SIFI boards finds support in these precedents. 
Admittedly, in large financial institutions, boards have limited 
oversight over the day-to-day actions of senior managers and other 
employees.  It is thus key that those managers and employees also take 
responsibility for the externalities that their actions could cause.211  A more 
other-regarding board can set an example for how others should conduct 
themselves,212 but merely setting an example is unlikely to be enough.  As 
per Stout’s model, clear instructions from authority are a key element in 
creating a more prosocial culture,213 and any other-regarding example set 
by the board will have little effect if managers give contrary instructions to 
employees to prioritize self-interest.  The next Subpart will therefore 
consider more granular reforms, in an attempt to encourage certain key 
financial institution employees to feel that more prosocial behavior is 
required of them and of their colleagues. 
 
 206.  Id. at 494. 
 207.  Brett McDonnell & Daniel Schwarcz, Regulatory Contrarians, 89 N.C. L. REV. 
1629 (2011). 
 208.  Id. at 1647. 
 209.  See supra note 198 and accompanying text (describing that several courts have 
held that bank directors owe duties to stakeholders other than shareholders). 
 210.  See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act § 115, 12 
U.S.C. § 5325 (2010) (authorizing increased prudential supervisory standards for SIFIs). 
 211.  “All actors, from the board down to the trader, need to know that when there is a 
conflict between regulatory objectives and the pursuit of value that it is lawful and 
legitimate to prioritize fair treatment or the avoidance of potential externalities.” Awrey et 
al., supra note 10, at 42; see also Sepe & Whitehead, supra note 188 (discussing the 
destabilizing potential of the activities of traders and other financial institution employees). 
 212.  Michelle Harner, Corporate Culture and ERM 2 (U. Md. Legal Studies Research 
Paper, Paper No. 2013-34, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2289432. 
 213.  STOUT, supra note 11, at 99. 
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2. Reform of Compliance and Risk-Management Functions 
While this Article argues that all financial sector employees need to 
engage in other-regarding behavior, much of the grunt work associated 
with minimizing industry externalities will fall on compliance personnel 
(who provide advice and training on compliance with regulations and 
professional and ethical standards)214 and risk-managers (who assess the 
firm’s risk exposure and communicate their findings to senior 
management).215  However, given that compliance personnel and risk-
managers do not directly generate profits for their employers, they often 
lack clout within the firm.216  As such, the reforms discussed in this Subpart 
will only succeed if senior management ensures the primacy and 
independence of the risk-management and compliance functions.217  From 
an institutional design perspective, compliance and risk-management 
personnel should report directly to senior management, instead of reporting 
to the heads of business units who may resent their “profit-killing” 
efforts.218  Increases in compensation for compliance and risk-management 
personnel would also communicate to the firm the importance that 
management places on these functions.  Regulators could encourage these 
reforms by taking such institutional design matters into account when 
discharging their supervisory task of assessing the adequacy of the 
financial institution’s management structure.219 
With support from senior management, compliance departments could 
aid in the creation of a more other-regarding culture by developing codes of 
ethical conduct that stress the importance of considering externalities – 
these should be highly publicized, and compliance should be rewarded and 
non-compliance addressed.220  To assist with enforcement, compliance 
 
 214.  Fanto, supra note 34, at 16-19. 
 215.  Rene M. Stulz, Risk Management Failures: What Are They and When Do They 
Happen, 20 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 39, 39 (2008). 
 216.  See David M. Driesen, Legal Theory Lessons From the Financial Crisis, 40 J. 
CORP. L. 55, 72 (2014) (“[F]irms tend to pay more attention to its traders’ views . . . because 
trading serves as a profit center.”). 
 217.  See Fanto, supra note 34, at 21. 
 218.  See FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM, supra note 189, at 2. (discussing the importance 
of independence and authority for risk-management personnel). In a similar vein, the U.K. 
Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards has advocated for “individual and direct 
lines of access and accountability to the board for the heads of the risk, compliance and 
internal audit functions and much greater levels of protection for their independence . . . .” 
U.K. Parliamentary Committee on Banking Standards, infra note 280, at 10. 
 219.  For a synopsis of the risk assessment processes of financial regulators, see Mehrsa 
Baradaran, Regulation by Hypothetical, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1247, 1275-76 (2014). 
 220.  Michelle Harner, Corporate Culture and ERM, DIRECTOR NOTES (The Conference 
Bd., New York, N.Y.), July 2013, at 2-3 .  Compliance with these codes is more likely if the 
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personnel could be directed to implement policies that allow for 
whistleblowing with respect to persons who fail to comply with the codes221 
(perhaps by taking outsize trading risks or by speciously valuing firm 
assets).222  The purpose of these codes goes beyond creating a basis for 
disciplinary action, however: they are also intended to serve an educative 
function by promoting a culture where compliance with the norm of 
indirect other-regarding behavior is seen as a primary motivator, and the 
shared responsibility of all financial institution employees.223  In particular, 
these educative efforts should stress that being a steward for financial 
stability is an important responsibility specifically conferred on those who 
work in the financial industry – thus maintaining the sense of prestige and 
importance that seems to motivate many in the industry.224 
Risk-management personnel can also play an important role in 
mitigating negative externalities caused by financial institution activities, 
but they will need to reorient their perspective somewhat in order to do so.  
At present, risk managers focus on the potential losses of the firm (or a 
division of the firm),225 but they could also be directed to assess – to the 
best of their knowledge – any risks being created for the financial system as 
a whole.226  Information about these risks would then be reported to senior 
management, who ideally would then make decisions aimed at minimizing 
 
codes are coupled with policies that designate individuals to oversee the entire life-cycle of 
a financial product or trading portfolio.  See supra note 203. 
 221.  Harner discusses the possibility of implementing such processes in Michelle 
Harner, The Potential Cost and Value of ERM, Director Notes (The Conference Bd., New 
York, N.Y.), Mar. 1, 2013, at 3. 
 222.  See, e.g., supra Part II.C (discussing examples of destabilizing behaviors by 
JPMorgan in 2012). 
 223.  See Fanto, supra note 34, at 18-19.  Bandes notes that norm-creation is a dynamic 
and social process, rather than an individualized one.  Bandes, supra note 21, at 225. 
 224.  The literature on changing social norms suggests that such efforts will be more 
successful if they reinforce rather than undermine the identities of their peers.  Short, supra 
note 23, at 506.  In her ethnography of Wall Street, Ho emphasizes that many in the industry 
view themselves as bearing the vital and difficult burden of purveying the capital “that 
forms the foundations and enables the growth and expansion of our largest corporations and 
public and private works.” Ho, supra note 25, at 27.  This sentiment seems to inform 
Goldman Sachs’ CEO Lloyd Blankfein’s infamous statement that banks are “doing God’s 
work.”  Dealbook, Blankfein Says He’s Just Doing ‘God’s Work’, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 
2009, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/11/09/goldman-chief-says-he-is-just-doing-gods-
work/.   
 225.  As Admati and Hellwig have noted, “the banks’ interests in measuring and 
managing risks are not the same as the public interest in having a safe financial 
system . . . .” ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 195, at 184. 
 226.  Of course, firms are not able to assess all of the systemic risks they are creating, as 
to do so would also require knowledge of their competitors’ strategies and how the various 
institutions’ strategies would interact. As such, the role of regulators in monitoring systemic 
risks remains vital.  Allen, New Philosophy, supra note 42, at 184. 
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such systemic risks (for example, by divesting assets deemed too risky, 
rather than layering them with complex derivatives as occurred in the 
London Whale episode).227  Importantly, this reconceptualization of the 
risk-management function as systemic risk monitor would require changes 
in the risk-management toolbox as well as a change in perspective. 
“Value-at-risk” (usually known as “VaR”) models are the risk 
assessment models currently favored by most financial institutions. A 
number of criticisms, however, have been leveled at these models from a 
systemic risk perspective.  They are used to estimate, within a given 
confidence level, the amount of money a firm, (or a business unit or a 
portfolio) could lose on any given day.228  However, they are significantly 
limited in that they focus on a firm’s risk in isolation,229 and also, because 
they presume that historical data is somewhat predictive of what will 
happen in the future, tend to discount low-probability “tail events” that fall 
outside of their historical data set.230  But it is these very tail events, during 
which it becomes clear that the firm’s risks are correlated and tightly 
coupled with the risks of other financial institutions,231 which threaten 
financial stability and are likely to generate the externalities that this 
Article is seeking to mitigate.  Although new and improved types of 
modeling techniques have been developed (for example, Monte Carlo 
models have been designed to more realistically simulate correlation 
amongst risks),232 even these more sophisticated models are subject to 
limitations in terms of their ability to predict the likelihood of a tail event 
occurring.233 
In addition, the usual critiques of the risk-modeling technologies 
discussed above fail to discuss the problems that quantitative modeling 
techniques pose for other-regarding behavior.  Even the more sophisticated 
results generated by Monte Carlo simulations “lack . . . human intuition.”234  
Because the experience of empathy for others involves limbic regions of 
the brain associated with emotional responses,235 to the extent that 
 
 227.  See supra text accompanying note 111 (discussing the London Whale incident). 
 228.  Kristin N. Johnson, Addressing Gaps in the Dodd-Frank Act: Directors’ Risk 
Management Oversight Obligations,45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 55, 69 (2011). 
 229.  See, for example, Gerding, supra note 45, at 169-86 (discussing some of the 
weaknesses of risk models).  
 230.  Johnson, supra note 228, at 71. 
 231.  Id. at 72. 
 232.  Id. at 72-73. 
 233.  Driesen notes that the accuracy of Monte Carlo models is dependent upon 
knowledge of the distribution of probabilities of certain outcomes – knowledge that is 
absent when dealing with complex systems like the financial system. Driesen, supra note 
216, at 78. 
 234.  Johnson, supra note 228, at 73. 
 235.  Zak, supra note 21, at 266. 
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processes are automated through mathematical models and no longer 
filtered through the human brain, any empathy that might have colored 
such judgments is lost.  As such, this Article argues that risk-managers 
should not be permitted to rely exclusively or unthinkingly on quantitative 
modeling in assessing their risks.236  Scenario analysis and creative 
thinking, performed by humans as well as computers, should become an 
integral part of the risk-management function.237 
C. Reform of Self-Regulation 
The previous two Subparts have explored certain externally-mandated 
reforms intended to inculcate a new culture in financial institutions. There 
are limits on what externally-mandated reforms can achieve, however.238  
As per Stout’s model, prosocial behavior flourishes in environments where 
there are instructions from authority to act prosocially and beliefs that 
others are acting prosocially.  If the financial industry is disdainful of 
external regulations (which it certainly seems to be at present),239 then 
industry participants may not view such external regulations as legitimate 
instructions from authority, nor will industry participants believe that 
others are complying with those instructions.240  Instead, norms of other-
regarding behavior are most likely to flourish under a regime of self-
regulation.  A self-regulatory authority is likely to have more credibility 
with the industry than an external regulator,241 and because self-regulation 
is intended to reflect the industry’s own standards, rather than externally 
imposed regulation, it is more likely to engender beliefs that prosocial, pro-
 
 236.  Stulz has expressed a similar sentiment: “I conclude that the probabilities of large 
losses are measured very imprecisely and that, as a consequence, companies should rely less 
on estimates of such probabilities and pay more attention to the implications of large losses 
for their survival.” Stulz, supra note 215, at 39. 
 237.  For a discussion of how stress tests, war games, and other scenario analyses can 
reduce excessive risk-taking, see Nizan Geslevich Packin, It’s (Not) All About The Money: 
Using Behavioral Economics to Improve Regulation of Risk Management in Financial 
Institutions, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 419, 479-81 (2013). 
 238.  Omarova, supra note 47, at 475. 
 239.  See also Donald C. Langevoort, State of Mind and the Global Financial Crisis 17 
(2013) (unpublished manuscript) (available at http://luc.edu/media/lucedu/law/centers/ 
investor/pdfs/langevoort.pdf) (discussing the psychological and cultural dimensions of the 
financial crisis). 
 240.  Fanto has noted that regulatory compliance could well be viewed by many broker-
dealers as “something external, and not reflective of their own self-identity and self-
definition, which are centered on their productive securities activities and the business 
groups where they conduct these activities.” Fanto, supra note 34, at 21; see also 
Dombalagian, supra note 12, at 498. 
 241.  Education and persuasion by peers and insiders is more likely to be effective in 
changing norms.  Short, supra note 23, at 506. 
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stability behavior is both expected and carried out by others in the industry.  
Theoretically at least, self-regulation shows significant promise for 
improving industry culture242 and could potentially displace some of the 
stricter legal rules that run the risk of crowding out moral norms of other-
regarding behavior.243 
However, financial industry self-regulation would have to be 
significantly reconceptualized to achieve a focus on financial stability.  In 
the United States, financial self-regulation has traditionally been very 
prescriptive and addressed things like competency and character – 
particularly in the context of relationships between industry personnel and 
clients.244  While this type of self-regulation sometimes requires 
professionals “to act beyond their self-interest[]” when acting for clients,245 
it does not address behaviors that generate instability and thus harm a 
broader group of persons with whom the professional has no direct 
connection.246  Given the difficulty in delineating destabilizing behaviors 
with any precision, it would be impossible to create any kind of 
prescriptive industry code or compliance manual that sought to deal with 
such destabilizing behaviors, and as such, any industry self-regulation 
would have to leave significant discretion to industry participants 
(particularly compliance departments) in determining what activities should 
be permitted. 
Unfortunately, this leaves us with something of a Catch-22.  While 
industry self-regulation is probably the best way to create a more other-
regarding culture, the amount of discretion required in a financial stability 
self-regulatory regime ensures that self-regulation that is not backed by a 
genuine cultural change will effectively be deregulatory (or perversely 
result in more selfish behavior, because the rubber stamp of self-regulation 
has the potential to cause members of a profession to abdicate 
responsibility for their own moral obligations).247  So how can the powers 
 
 242.  This discussion is premised on the understanding that self-regulation would work 
together with, rather than entirely supplant, traditional command-and-control regulation.  
For a discussion of the division of labor between government and industry self-regulation in 
the financial stability context, see Omarova, supra note 47, at 438-42. 
 243.  Fanto, supra note 34, at 31-32.  
 244.  Steven A. Ramirez, The Professional Obligations of Securities Brokers Under 
Federal Law: An Antidote for Bubbles?, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 527, 536, 538 (2002).  This type 
of self-regulation has evolved to address the significant opportunities for malfeasance that 
arise when firm employees are dealing with cash and personal property.  Fanto, supra note 
34, at 20. 
 245.  Andrew F. Tuch, The Self-Regulation of Investment Bankers, 83 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 101, 111 (2014). 
 246.  See Omarova, supra note 47, at 438 (discussing systematic risk created by the 
financial services industry). 
 247.  David DeSteno, Good Groups Can Lead to Bad Apples, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, July 
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that be in the financial industry be convinced to spearhead a more other-
regarding culture?  Omarova, drawing analogies from the nuclear power 
and chemical industries, has concluded that a more other-regarding 
financial industry culture will only develop if the industry sees itself as a “ 
‘community of fate’ whose future prosperity depend[s] upon its ability to 
impose collective self-restraint on its members’ profit-seeking activities in 
the name of public safety.”248  Essentially, unless there is a credible threat 
to financial institutions’ existence or profitability, industry leaders will not 
agitate for cultural change. 
The financial industry might feel an existential threat if senior 
managers of financial institutions genuinely believed that they would not 
be able to partake of government assistance in the event of a future crisis. 
But, in reality, this type of threat is not credible.  Even though Dodd-Frank 
asserts that there will be no more bailouts,249 bailouts are likely to remain a 
political necessity in times of crisis, and financial institutions know this.250  
The only threat that is likely to motivate financial institutions, then, is the 
fear of significant regulatory interference,251 especially if such regulation 
has the potential to significantly reduce profits.252  Along these lines, 
William Dudley, the President and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York reportedly unnerved some in the industry when he said in a 
recent speech:253 
 
[I]f those of you here today as stewards of these large financial 
institutions do not do your part in pushing forcefully for change 
across the industry, then bad behavior will undoubtedly persist.  
If that were to occur, the inevitable conclusion will be reached 
 
13, 2011, http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/out-character/201107/good-groups-can-
lead-bad-apples. 
 248.  Omarova, supra note 47, at 443, 446. 
 249.  The preamble to the Act describes it as an Act “to protect the American taxpayer 
by ending bailouts. . . .” Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 12 
U.S.C. Preamble (2010). 
 250.  Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 439 (2011). 
 251.  Omarova, supra note 47, at 453.  Examples of such regulatory changes include 
breaking up the big banks, or introducing a precautionary review procedure for financial 
institution trading strategies and product development. For a discussion of the former, see 
SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT 
FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 214-17 (2010).  For a discussion of the latter, see Saule T. Omarova, 
License To Deal: Mandatory Approval of Complex Financial Products, 90 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 63 (2012). 
 252.  Omarova, supra note 47, at 486-87. 
 253.  Peter Eavis, Regulator Tells Banks to Clean Up Bad Behavior or Face Downsizing, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2014, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/20/regulator-tells-banks-
to-clean-up-bad-behavior-or-face-downsizing/.   
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that your firms are too big and complex to manage effectively.  In 
that case, financial stability concerns would dictate that your 
firms need to be dramatically downsized and simplified so they 
can be managed effectively.254 
 
Despite Dudley’s strong words, though, the political power of 
financial institutions suggests that, at least at present, there is no real 
credible threat of significant regulatory reform.  Inevitably, we are left with 
the notion that a wholesale change in financial culture cannot be achieved 
until the political winds shift after the next financial crisis.255  This Article 
thus argues strenuously that the momentum of the next crisis must not be 
squandered: the response to that crisis must ensure that the leaders of 
financial institutions genuinely fear that if they do not adopt far-reaching 
self-regulatory reform and inculcate a more other-regarding culture, then 
they will face laws that impose significant structural reform on them.  In 
the interim, however, the externally-mandated reforms explored in Parts A 
and B of this Section should be pursued as potentially effective (albeit 
more limited) means of improving financial industry culture. 
III. LIMITATIONS OF OTHER MEANS OF ADDRESSING THE 
PATHOLOGIES 
Changing an industry’s culture is an enormous undertaking.  It is not 
surprising, then, that many proponents of financial reform prefer to focus 
on the more discrete tools of criminal prosecutions, private litigation, 
regulatory supervision and regulatory enforcement to promote financial 
stability.  However, as this section will explore, these traditional tools are 
limited in what they can achieve when dealing with behavior that is not 
fraudulent, but evinces a disregard for the consequences of financial 
instability for others.  Accordingly, this Section emphasizes that broader 
cultural reform is a necessary complement to the more traditional 
approaches to financial stability regulation. 
This section also helps explain why financial institutions (and their 
employees) are rarely punished for causing financial instability.  Criminal 
law and private litigation, for example, are limited in their ability to punish 
destabilizing behaviors largely because of the difficulties associated with 
 
 254.  Dudley, supra note 131. 
 255.  Depressingly, we probably will not have to wait too long for this: JPMorgan CEO 
Jamie Dimon testified his belief that financial crises will occur every five to seven years.  
Sewell Chan, Voices That Dominate Wall Street Take a Meeker Tone on Capitol Hill, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 14, 2010, at B5. 
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establishing moral culpability and causation.256  Financial instability arises 
not from the actions of one person or firm, but as a result of the aggregation 
and interaction of actions by a very large number of actors, magnified by 
correlations and feedback loops.257  Once a crisis has occurred, it is very 
difficult to pinpoint who is actually responsible for causing the instability, 
and what proportion of the fault lies at their door.258 In addition, many 
people who suffer as a result of financial instability do so not because they 
contracted with a financial institution, but because they are unable to get 
credit or lose their job as a result of the general economic malaise that 
follows a financial crisis.  It is very difficult to demonstrate with any 
precision that one person or firm is responsible for these individualized 
harms. 
With regard to the difficulty of establishing moral culpability, there 
will be some situations where complexity and cognitive failures entirely 
prevent financial institution personnel from appreciating the potential of 
their activities to damage financial stability and thus harm others.259  In 
such situations, any cause of action that requires a demonstration of moral 
culpability will certainly fail.  However, this Article has already made the 
case that most destabilizing behaviors entail both cognitive and moral 
failures.  Moral failures – in the form of failures of indirect other-regarding 
behavior – often contribute to financial instability, but they are different in 
kind from the more direct failure of dishonesty on which most white collar 
criminal prosecutions are predicated.260  Because neither the law nor society 
at large expects complete abnegation of self-interest – indeed, some level 
of self-interest is necessary to survival261 – it is very difficult to identify 
with any precision the tipping point at which acceptable self-interest 
becomes an immoral failure of other-regarding behavior. 
This is a fortiori the case in the context of collective action problems 
(like over-leveraged participation in asset price bubbles, and the 
corresponding fire sales that occur on the downside of the leverage 
 
 256.  See supra note 106 and accompanying text (discussing causation and the scienter 
requirement in 10b-5 claims). 
 257.  Awrey et al., supra note 10, at 33-34. 
 258.  David Zaring, Litigating the Financial Crisis, 100 VA. L. REV. 1433 (2014). 
 259.  See Langevoort, supra note 17, at 1218-20. 
 260.  STUART P. GREEN, LYING, CHEATING AND STEALING: A MORAL THEORY OF WHITE 
COLLAR CRIME 149 (2007). 
 261.  “Total self-restraint may also be destructive to markets.” Frankel, supra note 32, at 
92; “Self-interest . . . has its place as a factor shaping human behavior, but this place is 
alongside the moral forces that bind the individual to the community.” Richard M. 
Coughlin, Whose Morality? Which Community? What Interests? Socio-economic and 
Communitarian Perspectives, 25 J. SOCIO-ECONOMICS 137 (1996).  
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cycle),262 when individuals have such strong incentives to act in a self-
interested way that it is difficult to label their behavior as immorally self-
interested, notwithstanding that their collective behavior generates 
suboptimal outcomes for everyone.263  While the financial industry 
generally appreciates that financial stability is best served by not using 
leverage to bid up the price of assets beyond any reasonable assessment of 
their value or dumping assets in fire sales that are destructive of asset 
values system-wide,264 once these types of behaviors become prevalent, it 
can become too costly for financial industry personnel not to participate.  
However, as Hockett has identified, financial stability-related collective 
action problems often worsen over time, with each round of self-interested 
action taking society further away from the desired goal of financial 
stability.265  In the earliest rounds of a collective action problem, the 
disparity between self-interest and other-regarding behavior is not as 
pronounced, and it could thus be reasonable to expect a small sacrifice 
from the financial industry (in the form of other-regarding coordination) 
that would nip the incipient collective action problem in the bud.266  Again, 
however, it is difficult to identify the point at which the collective action 
problem becomes so bad that it is no longer reasonable to expect people to 
make sacrifices for the sake of coordination. 
The remainder of this section will explore in greater detail why 
criminal law and private litigation are so ill-suited to holding people 
accountable for failures of indirect other-regarding behavior.  It will also 
explain why, while regulation should certainly play an important role in 
addressing destabilizing behavior, its efficacy is limited to some extent.  
Finally, it will briefly explain why market discipline is not helpful in 
addressing destabilizing behaviors. 
 
 262.  Robert Hockett, Recursive Collective Action Problems: The Structure of 
Procyclicality in Financial Markets, Monetary Systems, Macroeconomies and Formally 
Similar Contexts, 3 J. FIN. PERSP. (forthcoming 2015) (available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2239849). 
 263.  Id. 
 264.  Of course this presumes some level of cognitive awareness of the consequences of 
collective action problems.  It is difficult to predict the exact consequences of such problems 
ex ante, but Zingales notes that people who have studied economics and finance are 
generally able to identify the outcome that is in the collective best interest of all persons 
involved.  Luigi Zingales, Do Business Schools Incubate Criminals?, BLOOMBERG VIEW 
(July 16, 2012), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2012-07-16/do-business-schools-
incubate-criminals-. 
 265.  Hockett, supra note 262. 
 266.  “[W]e can expect most people will be willing to make at least a small personal 
sacrifice . . . in order to behave prosocially.” STOUT, supra note 11, at 117. 
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A. Criminal Law 
To some extent, the dearth of criminal prosecutions in the wake of the 
Financial Crisis is a result of the evidentiary difficulties (and political 
economies) associated with prosecuting white-collar crimes.267  However, 
this Article asserts that the bigger issue is that many of the behaviors that 
destabilized the financial system and caused the Financial Crisis do not fit 
into our traditional frameworks for criminal liability.  While this Article 
appreciates that, at a gut level, many people want to see someone held 
accountable for the misery occasioned by the Crisis,268 it asserts that many 
of the destabilizing behaviors that brought the world economy to its knees 
are, and should remain, unpunishable. 
Federal criminal law, in its current form, is not designed to address 
non-fraudulent destabilizing behavior.  Federal wire, mail and securities 
fraud statutes all have scienter requirements that purport to require some 
type of dishonest mental state: wire fraud requires a defendant to have 
“devised or intend[ed] to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for 
obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, or promises.”269 The crime of mail fraud has similar 
elements.270  The prohibition on securities fraud makes it unlawful to either 
“employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud”; “make any untrue 
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in 
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading”; or “engage in any act, practice, or 
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit 
upon any person”; in each case in connection with the purchase or sale of a 
security.271  By focusing on deception, the plain language of each of these 
fraud statutes indicates that it does not apply to honest but self-interested 
 
 267.  For a discussion of these issues, see Geoffrey M. Gilchrist, The Special Problem of 
Banks and Crime, 85. U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 1 (2014) (“the non-prosecution of bankers is often 
explained by lack of evidence or the difficulty of white-collar prosecutions generally.”); 
Rakoff, supra note 97, at 4 (proving fraudulent intent by executives has been very difficult); 
Zaring, supra note 258, at 1435-37 (discussing the pros and cons of using white collar crime 
to regulate corporate misconduct).  This Article does not enter into the debate on whether 
the Department of Justice has been too lenient in prosecuting fraud committed in connection 
with the Financial Crisis.  The point made by this Article is that the most dangerous 
destabilizing behaviors do not constitute fraud, and are not properly the subject of any 
criminal prohibition. 
 268.  The public often desires the “closure and certainty” provided by criminal 
punishment.  Miriam Baer, Choosing Punishment, 92 B.U. L. REV. 577, 636 (2012).  
 269.  18 U.S.C. § 1343. 
 270.  18 U.S.C. § 1341. 
 271.  17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5. 
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behavior.272  Although courts have in some instances interpreted the 
scienter requirement for these fraud provisions as being satisfied by mere 
recklessness,273 such decisions “swim against a considerable tide of cases 
insisting on knowledge or intent for white-collar and regulatory crime 
offenses carrying significant prison sentences.”274 
Given that existing federal criminal law does not squarely address 
destabilizing behavior that lacks a deceitful mental state, this raises the 
question of whether a criminal offense should be created for this kind of 
behavior (perhaps with a shorter prison sentence than crimes committed 
with knowledge or intent).  Although there is much scholarly debate about 
why society chooses to criminalize behavior, there is some consensus 
around the “retributivist” view, which posits that actions are criminalized 
because society has an interest in seeing morally culpable behavior 
punished.275  It follows from the retributivist reasoning that imposing 
“punishment on people who were not at fault, or . . . in a way that was 
disproportionate to their fault, would be unjust.”276  In other words, 
criminal punishment should only be doled out when offenders deserve such 
punishment because they have acted in a morally culpable way.277 In 
criminal fraud cases, for example, the moral failure that is usually cited as 
“deserving” punishment is dishonesty.278  Because of the impossibility of 
clearly demonstrating the moral culpability inherent in a failure of indirect 
other-regarding behavior,279 this Article posits that that the perpetrators of 
 
 272.  Other criminal offenses that pertain particularly to financial institutions and their 
employees also tend to cover dishonest acts, rather than honest but destabilizing activities.  
For example, when Congress enacted 12 U.S.C. § 1833a to give prosecutors more latitude in 
pursuing bank misconduct, it only included crimes that involved some type of element of 
dishonesty.  All of the new criminal offenses introduced by Dodd-Frank similarly target 
direct, identifiable and dishonest conduct, like disclosure failures and failure to register. See 
Tiffany M. Joslyn, Criminal Provisions in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer 
Protection Act, NEW FED. INITIATIVES PROJECT, (The Federalist Soc’y for Law & Pub. 
Policy Studies, Wash., D.C.), Dec. 10, 2010, http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20101210 
_NFIPCrimProvisionsinDoddFrank.pdf (containing a catalogue of Dodd-Frank’s new 
crimes). 
 273.  Samuel W. Buell, What Is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L. J. 511, 557-58 (2011).   
 274.  Id. at 560. 
 275.  Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 
455 (1997).   
 276.  GREEN, supra note 260, at 22. 
 277.  Green argues that white collar offenses constitute crimes when the impugned 
behavior can be characterized as cheating, deception, stealing, coercion and exploitation, 
disloyalty, promise-breaking, and disobedience. Id. at 53-127.  All of these types of moral 
wrongfulness can be subsumed under the heading of dishonesty.   
 278.  Id. at 149. Although it should be noted that “criminal philosophy has yet to distill, 
in a concrete and usable fashion, an objective means for identifying the . . . nature of 
conduct that ‘deserves” punishment.’” Baer, supra note 268, at 596. 
 279.  See supra text accompanying notes 259-261.  Practically speaking, criminal 
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non-fraudulent destabilizing behaviors do not deserve to be punished with 
criminal penalties. 
Some disagree with this conclusion, and argue for the imposition of 
criminal offenses that penalize financial institution employees who 
honestly, but recklessly disregard financial stability.280  Criminal 
recklessness offenses typically include elements that reflect a cognizant 
disregard for societal norms about what is risky: those who ignore the 
potential consequences of those risks for others are seen as deserving 
punishment.281  However, in the complicated context of the financial 
system, there exists no broad social consensus about the types of risk-
taking that violate social norms at the time such risks are taken282 (although 
with the benefit of hindsight, we can usually say which risks turned out 
badly).283  Norms about financial risk-taking are not sufficiently precise ex 
ante that reckless failure to comply with such norms evinces a disregard for 
others that “deserves” to be criminalized.284 
There are also other, non-retributivist rationales that have been 
advanced for criminalizing behavior – amongst these, deterrence is of 
particular relevance to this Article (given that it seeks ways of preventing 
destabilizing behavior).285  Optimal deterrence theory posits that when 
 
prosecutors are better suited to navigating black-and-white issues like lying and cheating 
than this more nuanced concept of failure of indirect other-regarding behavior by way of 
undue risk taking.  Baer, supra note 268, at 635-36.   
 280.  For example, the U.K. Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards recently 
proposed new criminal offence for reckless mismanagement of financial institutions. 
PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSION ON BANKING STANDARDS, CHANGING BANKING FOR GOOD, 
2013-14, H.C. 175-I, at 10 (U.K.). 
 281.  Jed S. Rakoff, Conjoining “Recklessness” in Securities Fraud Cases to Moral 
Culpability, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 1447, 1456 (2013).  The Model Penal Code provides that:  
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when 
he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material 
element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature 
and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and 
the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from 
the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s 
situation. 
 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (2011). 
 282.  Rakoff, supra note 281, at 1453. 
 283.  For a discussion of hindsight bias, see Mitu Gulati, et al., Fraud By Hindsight, 98 
NW. U.  L. REV. 773, 775 (2004). 
 284.  Buell notes that in the criminal context, we cannot “easily justify ex ante 
vagueness, with large gaps to be filled in terms of specific behaviors entirely ex post.” 
Buell, supra note 273, at 521.   
 285.  Criminalizing behavior is usually justified by one or more of the following 
rationales: “deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation and desert.”  Paul H. Robinson, 
Criminal Law Scholarship: Three Illusions, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 287, 290 (2001).  
It should be noted, though, that some are skeptical about the deterrence justification for 
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faced with a criminal sanction, a potential offender will calculate the 
likelihood of detection and the cost of being punished if detected, weigh 
these against the benefits of transgression, and make a rational decision as 
to whether or not it is worthwhile to engage in the activity.286  
Unfortunately, a lack of clarity about what is and is not acceptable behavior 
constrains the efficacy of any deterring sanction,287 and destabilizing 
behaviors defy the creation of clear criminal sanctions.  Many potentially 
destabilizing behaviors are necessary – at least to some degree – to the 
proper functioning of the financial system.  They should not be the subjects 
of an outright criminal ban.288  Instead, it is the self-interested misuse of 
these activities that we wish to prevent, but this Article has already 
explored in depth the difficulty in delineating a bright-line ex ante rule as to 
the self-interest that is acceptable, and the self-interest that we wish to 
deter.289  As such, criminal law will not function as an effective deterrent of 
non-fraudulent, but destabilizing, financial activities. 
B. Private Litigation 
In some contexts, “civil liability for extremely poor judgment . . . has 
filled gaps that the criminal law leaves behind.”290 But private litigation is 
also largely unsuitable for punishing non-fraudulent behavior that has a 
diffuse impact on society at large.  Most of the people who suffer in the 
negative economic conditions that follow financial crises will be prevented 
from bringing claims against the financial institutions that have generated 
the instability, because to establish standing, “the plaintiff must establish 
injury-in-fact; [and] the plaintiff must show a connection between the 
injury and the conduct alleged.”291  The law generally does not view pure 
 
criminalizing behavior: Baer argues “[d]eterrence may well be invoked as a justification for 
punishment, but lay intuitions about culpability and moral outrage appear to outweigh the 
factors that ought to matter most under a deterrence-based scheme.” Baer, supra note 268, at 
588. 
 286.  Short, supra note 23, at 496.  Optimal deterrence theory does not enjoy universal 
support, however - it has been criticized on behavioral economic grounds, which call into 
question whether people actually make accurate assessments of the likelihood and costs of 
punishment.  Id. at 496-97.  These concerns are even more salient when dealing with 
something as complex as financial risk-taking, further undermining the case for deterrence 
in this context. 
 287.  Id. at 505. 
 288.  See supra text accompanying notes 42-43 (discussing the necessity of some level 
of innovation and leverage). 
 289.  See supra text accompanying notes 261-266 (discussing the necessity of some level 
of self-interest). 
 290.  Christine Hurt, The Duty to Manage Risk, 39 J. CORP. L. 253, 257 (2014). 
 291.  Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Private Enforcement of Systemic Risk Regulation, 43 
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economic loss as a compensable injury,292 so the injury-in-fact element is 
an insurmountable hurdle for most potential plaintiffs in this context.293  
Furthermore, this Article has already explored how difficult it is to attribute 
causation of financial instability to any one financial institution,294 and so 
the requirement to show a causal connection between injurious conduct and 
injury will also prevent most potential plaintiffs from having standing. 
It is possible that financial institutions and their employees might 
nonetheless be deterred from engaging in destabilizing behavior if they 
faced a real threat of litigation from those who do have standing, 
notwithstanding that any damages awarded in such claims would not come 
close to encompassing the full amount of harm externalized by financial 
institutions in a crisis.295  As the law currently stands, though, even 
individuals who are likely to have standing (either because they are 
shareholders in a financial institution, or because they have transacted 
directly with a financial institution) face major challenges in punishing 
destabilizing behaviors.  For example, civil common law fraud claims 
require some demonstration of actual dishonesty (in the sense that the 
maker of the statement knew or believed the statement to be false).296  
Securities fraud claims297 only require a demonstration of recklessness (a 
lesser standard of culpability than dishonesty),298 but as the previous Part 
explored, recklessness is very difficult to establish in a context where there 
is no ex ante societal consensus about which levels of financial risk-taking 
are acceptable, and which are not.299  As such, fraud claims have limited 
applicability to destabilizing behaviors, and are often used to address 
attempts to cover-up previous destabilizing behaviors (once the damage has 
 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 993, 1009 (2010). 
 292.  Armour & Gordon, supra note 199, at 15.   
 293.  Courts have also ruled that there is no implied private right of action to enforce 
prudential regulations.  Schooner, supra note 291, at 1008-09.  Schooner has argued that a 
“qui tam” process should be implemented that would allow private plaintiffs to enforce 
macroprudential regulations against financial institutions.  Id. at 1011-17.  This proposal is 
intriguing, and has the potential to improve enforcement of existing macroprudential 
regulations.  However, by definition, it will only address behaviors that have been identified 
ex ante as problematic for financial stability—it would not impact what financial institutions 
do in the space beyond regulation. 
 294.  See supra text accompanying notes 256-258. 
 295.  See Armour & Gordon, supra note 199, at 36 (discussing the limitations of tort 
remedies in the context of systemic harm). 
 296.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 (1977). 
 297.  These claims are brought pursuant to 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5. 
 298.  The Supreme Court has noted, without expressly deciding the issue, that all circuit 
courts have allowed plaintiffs to plead that a defendant acted recklessly.  Tellabs, Inc. v 
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. 551 U.S. 308, 319-20 (2007).  Of course, plaintiffs can also 
plead that the defendant acted intentionally. 
 299.  See supra text accompanying notes 282-284. 
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been done), rather than the behaviors themselves.300  Alternatively, a 
plaintiff could try to fit destabilizing behaviors into the negligence law 
framework, but such claims will only succeed if negligent conduct is a 
“substantial factor in bringing about the harm.”301  Proving such causation 
is likely to be very difficult, given that financial instability generally arises 
from the collective actions of an entire industry.302 
One private cause of action that might seem to hold some promise for 
addressing financial instability would be a breach of fiduciary duty suit 
against financial institution directors, alleging failure to monitor 
destabilizing behaviors.303  However, the Delaware courts (and most major 
U.S. financial institutions are incorporated in Delaware) tend to be very 
deferential to boards, and have ruled that boards will only be subject to 
oversight liability when there is “a sustained or systematic failure of the 
board to exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a 
reasonable information and reporting system exists”.304  This is very 
difficult to prove, with the result that plaintiffs rarely succeed in 
establishing oversight liability.305  Furthermore, courts have typically held 
that such a duty to monitor applies to legal and compliance risks, but not to 
business risks.306 This approach largely precludes holding boards liable for 
flawed oversight of risk-management policies.  It is, of course, open to the 
courts (or legislators) to reinterpret fiduciary duties to include a duty to 
monitor risk-management decisions,307 but it is very unlikely that they will 
do so: that would be tantamount to abandoning the long-standing “business 
judgment rule” presumption with respect to financial risk-taking.308  
Furthermore, even assuming that courts were willing to effectively 
abrogate the business judgment rule in this context, it is not clear that doing 
 
 300.  See, for example, the securities fraud claims that have been brought against 
JPMorgan in the wake of the London Whale episode, discussed in the text accompanying 
note 126. 
 301.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1977). 
 302.  In one case arising out of the Financial Crisis, the jury agreed that some kind of 
wrong had been perpetrated, but were unable to identify any one person as the single party 
responsible.  SEC v. Stoker, 865 F. Supp. 2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Rakoff, supra note 281, 
at 1456. 
 303.  These claims are known as “Caremark claims,” after the case In re Caremark Int’l 
Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).  Such types of claims have been 
characterized as a last resort. Hurt, supra note 290, at 269. 
 304.  In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Deriv. Litig. 698 A.2d at 971. 
 305.  Armour & Gordon, supra note 199, at 33. 
 306.  Hurt, supra note 290, at 282. 
 307.  For example, Armour & Gordon have proposed that “those controlling a systemic 
firm fac[e] liability to their firm for conflicts of interest or negligence as regards decisions 
capable of contributing to systemic risk.” Armour & Gordon, supra note 199, at 29. 
 308.  Id. at 289-90. 
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so would be advisable.  Such a duty to ensure prudent risk-management 
would require courts “to determine what amount of risk-taking is excessive 
for a given firm at the point of time the decision was made”:309 just as with 
recklessness,310 such a determination invites hindsight bias and a confusion 
of bad outcomes with bad acts. 
C. Command-and-Control Regulation 
Given that the private causes of action in our legal system are ill-
suited to punishing the pathologies of banking business as usual, this Part 
will examine the role that command-and-control financial regulation can 
play.  Financial regulators seem the most appropriate candidates to identify 
ex ante activities that are likely to be destabilizing and to take steps to 
either control or prohibit those activities.  An institution’s failure to comply 
with such regulations can then be punished with civil sanctions,311 even if it 
cannot be proved that the consequences of the offending actions were 
actually destabilizing, or morally culpable.  I have previously written 
regarding the benefits of such proactive legislation,312 but I nonetheless 
recognize its limits: given the complexity of the financial system, it would 
be impossible for regulators to anticipate, catalogue and regulate ex ante 
every type of behavior that could prove destabilizing.313  Even if regulators 
could do so, there are still resource constraints that limit their ability to 
supervise financial institutions and enforce their regulations.314  
Furthermore, such regulations would remain susceptible to arbitrage by 
financial institutions (at least for so long as those institutions were 
motivated purely by norms of short-term self-interest).  Finally, regulators 
are not always paragons of public service—their willingness to promote 
financial stability is also limited at times. 
In the lead-up to the Financial Crisis, for example, financial regulators 
failed to take steps to protect consumers from unsavory lending practices, 
which would have reduced the number of residential mortgage loans made, 
taking some air out of the real estate and MBS bubbles.  In particular, the 
Federal Reserve failed to use its power under the Home Ownership and 
Equity Protection Act to create uniform federal mortgage lending rules to 
 
 309.  Id. at 260. 
 310.  See supra text accompanying notes 282-284. 
 311.  The available regulatory sanctions include civil penalties, cease-and-desist orders, 
orders for suspension, removal and prohibition, as well as less formal regulatory pressure. 
Schooner, supra note 291, at 1005-1006.   
 312.  Allen, New Philosophy, supra note 42. 
 313.  Armour & Gordon, supra note 199, at 27. 
 314.  Dudley, supra note 131; Schooner, supra note 291, at 1001. 
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prohibit predatory lending practices,315 and the OCC and OTS sought to 
preempt any state efforts to reign in consumer abuses by banks.316  
Essentially, the regulators prioritized bank profitability over how banks 
dealt with their customers.317  To some extent this can be attributed to 
cognitive failure by the banking regulators: they failed to fully appreciate 
that ignoring consumer protection would lead to poor quality mortgages, 
which would then be securitized with ramifications both for the safety and 
soundness of individual institutions, and for the economy as a whole.318  
But banking regulators had been alerted to these issues. Consumer 
advocates continually complained to the regulators, and within the Federal 
Reserve Governor Gramlich was a vocal advocate for improving oversight 
over consumer protection issues.319  Furthermore, in 2007, Professors Engel 
and McCoy made explicit the destabilizing potential of these failures of 
consumer protection.320  The regulators’ decision to ignore these warnings 
can be partially attributed to moral failings: either because regulators had 
unconsciously internalized the self-interested worldview of the financial 
industry,321 or because regulators sought a conflict-free life by avoiding 
complaint from the financial sector,322 they chose to allow consumer abuses 
 
 315.  The Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act, enacted in 1994, gave the Federal 
Reserve the power to enact industry-wide rules to reign in abusive mortgage practices.  The 
rules promulgated by the Fed in 2001 only covered 1% of all mortgages.  In fact, the Fed did 
not use its HOEPA authority to issue rules that required most lenders to ensure the 
borrower’s ability to repay until 2008, after the subprime bubble had already burst.  FCIC 
Report, supra note 71, at 77–94. 
 316.  Id. at 96, 112. 
 317.  See Heidi Mandanis Schooner, The Role of Central Banks in Bank Supervision in 
the United States and the United Kingdom, 28 BROOK. J. OF INT’L L. 411, 427 (2003) 
(“[T]he Federal Reserve’s . . . regulatory role remains focused on safety and soundness and 
not on other goals of financial regulation, such as consumer protection.”).   
 318.  See generally Hearing on “Consumer Protections in Financial Services: Past 
Problems, Future Solutions” Before the. S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs, 111th Cong. 11-23 (2009) (statement of Patricia A. McCoy, George J. & Helen M. 
England Professor of Law, Univ. of Conn. Sch. of Law); see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., 
The Financial Service Industry’s Misguided Quest to Undermine the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 881, 926 (2012); Adam J. Levitin, 
Hydraulic Regulation: Regulating Credit Markets Upstream, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 143, 152 
(2009). 
 319.  FCIC Report, supra note 71, at 95. 
 320.  Engel & McCoy, supra note 73. 
 321.  For a discussion of cognitive capture of regulators, see Willem H. Buiter, Central 
Banks and Financial Crises, MAINTAINING STABILITY IN A CHANGING FINANCIAL SYSTEM: A 
SYMPOSIUM SPONSORED BY THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY 495, 601 (Fed. 
Res. Bank of Kan. City, 2009); James Kwak, Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis, in 
PREVENTING CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE IN REGULATION, AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 
(Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2013).  
 322.  With regard to the desire of regulators to avoid criticism and political intervention, 
see DAVID ANDREW SINGER, REGULATING CAPITAL: SETTING STANDARDS FOR THE 
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to continue. 
Even after problematic behavior has occurred, regulators have not 
consistently addressed institutional wrong-doing: there has been much 
criticism of the SEC, for example, for not bringing “failure to supervise” 
actions against the large financial institutions in the wake of the Financial 
Crisis.323  And as the JPMorgan “London Whale” episode illustrates, 
unreliable regulatory supervision of institutions persists even after the 
Crisis.324  Given these demonstrated limitations of financial regulators and 
command-and-control regulation, it would be imprudent to rely exclusively 
on them to ensure financial stability. 
D. Incentives Regulation 
Another potential regulatory avenue for addressing destabilizing 
behavior is to structure incentives (including by way of compensation 
reform, and the implementation of Pigouvian taxes) to encourage better 
behavior amongst financial industry personnel.325  This Article has already 
explored some of the difficulties inherent in using incentives regulation to 
improve financial stability.326  Essentially, the concern is that it is very 
difficult to precisely calibrate incentives to produce the desired 
behavior327—particularly because of the difficulty of identifying, in 
advance, the benchmark level of desirable risk-taking for financial 
institutions that should be incentivized—and incentives that are not 
perfectly targeted can have unintended harmful consequences.328  There is 
 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 22 (2007). 
 323.  See Aruna Viswanatha, Analysis: SEC Targets Low-Level Bankers, Spares Top 
Execs, REUTERS (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/15/us-sec-
enforcement-idUSTRE7AE2BN20111115. “Failure to supervise” actions are brought by the 
SEC pursuant to Section 15(b)(6) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, for an 
individual’s failure to comply with the obligation under Section 15(b)(4)(E) “reasonably to 
supervise, with a view to preventing violations of [the securities laws], another person who 
commits such a violation, if such other person is subject to his supervision.” 15 U.S.C. § 
78o(b)(4)(E). It should be noted, however, that such “failure to supervise” actions would not 
cover inordinate risk-taking, as this is not a violation of the securities laws. 
 324.  See supra text accompanying notes 128-130. 
 325.  See, e.g., with respect to compensation, Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, 
Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247 (2010).  For a discussion of Pigouvian taxes in 
the financial sector, see Douglas A. Shackelford, Daniel N. Shaviro & Joel Slemrod, 
Taxation and the Financial Sector, 63 NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL 781 (2010). 
 326.  See supra text accompanying notes 189-190. 
 327.  See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
 328.  For example, corporate governance reforms that sought to align managers’ interests 
with stockholders’ interests by granting managers more equity-based compensation, 
inadvertently caused mangers to be much more short-termist in their outlook.  STOUT, supra 
note 11, at 250. 
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also a risk that when incentives-based regulation appeals only to the self-
interest of financial industry personnel (for example, by subjecting their 
bonuses to clawbacks if losses subsequently materialize),329 the penalties 
involved can be interpreted simply as a “cost of doing business.” 
Experimental studies have found that the introduction of penalties can 
refocus individuals’ attention on those penalties, to the exclusion of any 
concern for others that might have otherwise motivated their behavior.330 
This Article therefore emphasizes the importance of supplementing 
(and in some cases, substituting) incentives regulation and command-and-
control regulation with policies that aim to maximize people’s natural 
inclinations towards other-regarding behavior.  The intention is not to 
understate the importance of rules and incentives in engendering financial 
stability—moral norms alone cannot regulate the financial system.  Rather, 
this Article asserts that policymakers should aim to calibrate a cocktail of 
(i) command-and-control type rules, (ii) incentives and (iii) policies that 
encourage indirect other-regarding behavior, in the way that seems best 
calculated to engender financial stability.  Part of this task entails 
recognizing which type of tool is best suited to which type of problem; 
norms of indirect other-regarding behavior are the best tool available for 
addressing the pathologies of banking business as usual. 
E. Market Discipline 
Finally, it is worth briefly considering whether private market 
discipline can play a role in circumscribing undesirable destabilizing 
behaviors.  Unfortunately, in the financial markets, self-interested market 
discipline cannot force financial institutions to stop taking socially 
undesirable risks: “the social costs of bank failure extend far beyond losses 
to creditors,” and so even if market discipline worked perfectly, “the 
contractual internalization of social costs would only be partial.”331  In 
practice, because of creditor apathy and the opacity of financial institution 
risk-taking, self-interested market discipline falls far short of achieving 
even this theorized partial internalization.332  As such, purely self-interested 
 
 329.  For an argument in favor of such clawbacks, see Brian Bell & John Van Reenen, 
Bankers’ Bonuses: Claw-back Clauses Are Critical, VOXEU (May 3, 2010), available at 
http://www.voxeu.org/article/bankers-bonuses-claw-back-clauses-are-critical. 
 330.  See, e.g., Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29  J. OF LEGAL STUD. 
1 (2000) (discussing the effect of introducing a fine for parents who were late picking up 
their children from day care; counterintuitively, this resulted in an increased number of late 
collections); see also STOUT, supra note 11, at 191-92 (“By emphasizing external material 
incentives, the day-care centers crowded out ‘internal’ incentives like guilt and empathy.”).  
 331.  Armour & Gordon, supra note 199, at 14. 
 332.  For a comprehensive discussion of the inability of market discipline to address 
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actions in the financial markets fail to prevent widespread instability. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has provided a nuanced exploration of the pathologies of 
banking business as usual, and the moral and cognitive failures that drive 
them.  It has demonstrated that when financial stability is at stake, the 
moral failure that must be addressed is a failure of indirect other-regarding 
behavior, rather than the failure of honesty that the law is more accustomed 
to addressing.  Because neither criminal law nor private litigation are 
appropriate for addressing failures of indirect other-regarding behavior 
after the fact, and because it can sometimes be difficult for command-and-
control regulation to prevent destabilizing activities ex ante, we are left 
with the (somewhat dispiriting) conclusion that the maintenance of 
financial stability sometimes rests on financial industry participants 
choosing to care about the externalities of their actions. 
It is thus vitally important that proponents of financial reform consider 
ways of changing the prevailing Wall Street culture from one that is 
governed entirely by norms of short-term self-interest, to one that is 
tempered by norms of stewardship for financial stability.  To date, attempts 
to address industry culture have largely been restricted to structuring 
incentives to align the industry’s self-interest with society’s interest in 
financial stability.  However, it can be very difficult to determine ex ante 
the precise type of behavior that we want to incentivize and to tailor 
incentives accordingly.  As such, it is vital that the debate on financial 
stability reform also be informed by the interdisciplinary research on other-
regarding behavior that recognizes that in the right circumstances, people 
will engage in other-regarding stability-minded behavior simply because 
they view it as the right thing to do. 
It may well be that true cultural change in the financial industry will 
not be feasible until after the next financial crisis—but the industry must be 
threatened with real reform then, or else it will have little impetus to 
become more other-regarding, and we will find ourselves in an exacerbated 
boom and bust cycle that disproportionately affects the most vulnerable 
members of society.  We should not have to wait for a crisis, however, to 
implement the business education and governance reforms explored in this 
 
systemic risk, see David Min, Understanding the Failures of Market Discipline, 42 WASH. 
U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015).  For these reasons, there seems to have been little by way of 
discipline from bank creditors in the boom years leading up to the Financial Crisis.  Anat 
Admati et al., Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital 
Regulation: Why Bank Equity is Not Expensive 34 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance at 
Stanford Univ. Working Paper Series, No. 161,,2013). 
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Article.  These reforms are designed to improve the likelihood that 
financial institutions will take a more proactively other-regarding stance, 
and at least give some consideration to the potential externalities of their 
activities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
